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Introduction
Life expectancies in industrialized economies have grown, and birth rates have fallen.
The number of those who pay for public pensions is shrinking, while the number of beneficiaries
is growing, which supposedly puts public pensions in crisis. The question thus is whether we can
still afford to pay for public pension programs in industrialized countries.
Most industrialized countries introduced public pensions to avert old age poverty.
Because lifetime earnings and savings are unpredictable, public pensions offer an income
guarantee to retirees of sufficient income for life out of poverty. Without Social Security in the
U.S., an additional 39% of Americans over 65 would have lived in poverty in 1998.
Even though countries are still committed to provide public support for workers to reduce
old age poverty, this promise seems to have hit a stumbling block. The argument is that because
of demographic changes – more old people, and less young people – public pensions have to
scale back their promises or raise taxes to unrealistic levels.
The impediments, however, to paying for public pensions are caused more by political
decisions than by economic realities in seven OECD countries. By and large, public pensions
may encounter a willingness-to-pay crisis, but not an ability-to-pay crisis.
Expenditures for old-age income programs are already the largest social expenditure. In
most cases, expenditures can be expected to increase with the aging of each country’s
populations. However, whether growing expenditures can still be financed depends on the
expected economic trends, on the structure of each country’s public pension system and on the
willingness of policy makers to increase revenues for public pensions if needed.
The growing financial needs of public pensions, mirrored in rising tax rates, are
attributable to economic changes and to the structure of public pension systems. Slow or
declining employment growth, low productivity and wage growth, and increasing income
inequality have resulted in increasing public pension financing demands on workers.
As far as the future is concerned, most projections are overly pessimistic in their
economic assumptions. Yet, even with pessimistic assumptions tax rates may decline and living
standards may increase over the next decades. If better than expected economic trends
materialize, each country’s ability to pay for public pensions should also grow.
Because of a growing sense of crisis regarding the future of public pensions, though,
more attention has focused on private market investments as a substitute for public pensions. But
opponents of privatization point to its higher risks and costs, which makes private pensions a
poor substitute for public pensions. However, because people’s life expectancies are increasing,
long-term financial needs are likely to increase, too. Some of these additional needs may not be
met by public pensions. Hence, private pensions may serve as a supplement to public pensions.
Background
The Anti-Poverty Success of Public Pensions
Public pensions are designed to keep most if not all of the elderly out of poverty. The
evidence suggests that public pensions are an important income source for pensioners (Hauser,
1998). Public pensions ranged from 58% of total gross household income in Italy in 1989 to 83%
in West Germany in 1989. Also, pensions provided more than two thirds of gross household
income in France (81%) in 1989, in the UK (68%) in 1991, and in the U.S. (67%) in 1991
1.
Consequently, old age poverty is significantly reduced through government transfers,
mainly in the form of pensions (Smeeding, 1997). Germany and Sweden have high market
income poverty rates, 65.8% in 1989 and 91.6% in 1992, respectively. Thanks largely to public
pensions the German rates drop to 7.5%, and the Swedish to 6.4%. Similarly, in France and Italy,2
old age poverty is reduced through a variety of programs, of which public pensions are the
largest. In France, old-age poverty declines from 79.9% in 1984 to 4.8%, and in Italy from
55.7% to 4.4%. Finally, in the UK and the U.S. public pensions are also an important tool to
lower old age poverty. Due to low benefit levels the reductions are from 68.5% to 23.9% in the
UK in 1991 and from 58.7% to 19.6% in the U.S. in 1994 (Smeeding, 1997)
2.
Using different poverty thresholds for the U.S., the success of public pensions shows the
same order of magnitude. According to the Social Security Administration (2000b), public
pensions lowered old age poverty by 39% to 10.4% of pensioner households in 1998.
Crisis? What Crisis?
Public pension expenditures are the largest social expenditure in six of the seven OECD
countries – with Japan as the exception, where medical expenses are slightly larger.
The fact that public pension expenditures relative to GDP have grown between 1980 and
1995 seems important for the growing sense that there is a public pension crisis in OECD
countries (table 1). The smallest increases appear in Germany (+0.3%) and in the U.S. (+0.3%).
In comparison, the increases are most pronounced in Japan (+2.2%), France (+2.6%), and Italy
(+3.6%), leaving Sweden (+1.3%) and the UK (+1.4%) with more moderate changes.
* Insert table 1 here*
Even where expenditures have increased, expenditures relative to GDP are still
manageable. France and Italy surpassed Germany only in the 1990’s with their spending on old-
age cash assistance. By 1995, Italy’s expenditures were 0.7% higher than Germany’s, and
France’s were 0.07% larger than Germany’s. Further, if Japan’s expenditures relative to GDP
continued to grow at the same rate as they had between 1980 and 1995, it would take more than
30 years before they exceeded 10% of GDP. Incidentally, this is the level that has been sustained
by Germany between 1980 and 1995. The expenditure levels do not leave the impression that
public pensions are in a state of crisis.
The tax burden for workers, though, seems to be more at the heart of the asserted public
pension crisis, not expenditures. Most funding for public pensions stems from payroll taxes, with
some additional support from general revenues.
Table 2 provides data on tax rates in the seven OECD countries since the 1961. Tax rates
have only continuously increased in Germany and the U.S., which are also the two countries
where expenditures relative to GDP have been relatively stable. In France and Italy, tax rates
have increased since the 1970s. However, while the largest increases of French tax rates occurred
in the 1970s, the largest jumps in Italian tax rates came in the 1990s. Further, Swedish tax rates
increased sharply in the 1960s, declined in the 1970s and again in the 1990s after remaining
stable in the 1980s. Also, Japanese tax rates dropped slightly in the 1980s before increasing
again in the 1990s. Finally, British tax rates increased sharply in the 1970s, before declining in
the 1980s and increasing in the 1990s.
* Insert table 2 here *
However, the tax rate increases in five countries in the 1990s hardly support the argument
that public pensions are already in a crisis. First, in France combined tax rates in 1999 are still
below their 1961 levels. Similarly, the combined British tax rates in 1999 were only 0.37
percentage points higher than the ones in 1975. Moreover, average tax increases in France in the3
1990s were the smallest ever. Also, American rates have remained flat in the 1990s and Swedish
rates have declined over the course of the 1990s. Finally, German tax rates have increased,
despite the fact that expenditures have remained stable. Thus, only two out of seven countries,
Italy and Japan, have both rapid tax increases and rising expenditure levels.
For the outlook on public pension finances forecasts of economic trends become crucial.
The crisis scenario is often predicated on the notion that life expectancies increase, fertility rates
decline, and that the demographic slowdown leads to less economic growth
3.
Table 3 shows the relevant demographic forecasts. The share of people 65 years old and
over relative to the total population is expected to increase dramatically. By 2000, the share of
the elderly is expected to be somewhere between 13% (U.S.) and 18% (Italy), and is expected to
increase to between 20% (U.S.) and 36% (Italy) by 2050.
* Insert table 3 here *
While the share of the elderly is projected to rise dramatically, these forecasts are rather
meaningless. What matters to future generations is their standard of living, which depends only
partially on the number of retirees they have to support. Gains in labor productivity make it
easier for future workers to support more retirees. Also, unemployment may decline and
employment may grow, making it even easier for all workers to support all the elderly.
The OECD’s estimates highlight also some of the problems with long-range forecasts.
Most forecasts are sensitive to the underlying assumptions, especially with respect to labor force
participation and productivity growth. Labor force participation often receives only scant
attention despite its importance in determining future projections (Turner et al., 1998;
Herbertsson et al., 2000). Without any changes in labor force participation rates, GNP per capita
will be 95% higher in the EU in 2050 than in 1995 (Turner et al., 1998). Allowing for higher
labor force participation and lower unemployment, GDP per capita could be 138% higher than in
1995. In the OECD’s calculation, changes in labor force participation have a greater impact on
living standards in the EU than any other change. Further, productivity growth is one of the most
important determinants of future living standards (Baker, 2001). But, the OECD study does not
even consider the impact of faster rising productivity. Instead, historically low levels of
productivity growth, 1.4%, are extrapolated over 50 years. Historically, productivity growth has
never been this low for extended periods of time (table 6).
Other model calculations that focus on tax rates rely on pessimistic economic
assumptions, too. Sinn (1999) argues that German tax rates will rise from 20% to over 30% by
2030. Also, Prognos AG (1998) estimated that German tax rates will increase merely to 24% by
2040, but it put a significantly higher burden on general revenues, thereby increasing the overall
tax burden (Sinn and Thum, 1999). Both studies assume constant or low labor force participation
rates of the working age population, and constantly high or even increasing unemployment rates
(Sinn and Thum, 1999). Both model calculations also assume low productivity and wage growth.
Forecasts of rising tax rates and lower than otherwise expected living standards are based
on overly pessimistic assumptions. Further, even where tax rates are expected to increase, living
standards, as measured by after-tax wages are still projected to rise (Baker, 2001).
Economic and Demographic Factors Influencing Public Pensions in Theory
The following schematic discussion may be helpful to understand how economic factors
could impact public pension finances. In general, public pension finances can be affected by
employment and productivity growth and by changes in income distribution. Declining4
employment and lower wages both result in a smaller tax base. Further, a redistribution of
income from labor to capital shrinks the tax base as wages are not rising as fast as productivity,
and a rise in income inequality raises benefit payments disproportionately because public
pensions are income insurance programs designed to keep people out of poverty.
Public pensions receive income either from payroll taxes or from general revenues.
Generally speaking, public pension income is the product of the tax rate times covered income.
The tax rate is the combined tax rate levied on employers and employees, and the implicit tax
rate charged to general revenue. Covered income is the sum of all covered incomes:
ContributionT = tTY(NT ; ￿y wT) (1)
where t is the combined tax rate in period T, Y is total covered income, N is the number
of covered employees in period T, and y is an individual worker’s income in period T.
Increasing financial needs can arise as contributions decline relative to benefits payments.
The share of the population that contributes to public pensions declines or grows slower than the
number of beneficiaries because of lower employment growth or higher unemployment. Further,
covered income either declines or grows slower than the benefits because real wages decline or
grow at a slower pace. Slower wage growth may be the result of sluggish productivity growth or
of a redistribution of income towards profits or both. Also, where countries have implemented a
cap on income above which taxes are not applicable, greater income inequality means that an
increasing amount of total income lies above the cap leaving a smaller taxable base. Finally, tax
rates can be lowered by legislative act to reduce the revenue stream to public pensions.
Greater financing needs can also arise from faster growth of benefits (relative to
contributions). Benefits are a function of eligibility criteria, individual earnings histories,
indexation of past earnings and of benefits, a redistributive factor and a demographic factor:
BenefitsT  (NBT) = ￿b iT (2)
biT = r￿￿ I BT ((EIwwBt )/Time(NRA; pensionable earnings years)) (3)
Total benefits payable in period T are the sum of all individual benefits biT over all
beneficiaries in period T, NBT. Individual benefits are determined by individual earnings histories
indexed by earnings indexation factor, IB, and divided by the number of eligible years, which is
again a function of the normal retirement age, NRA, and of the number of years of pensionable
earnings an individual has had. The average wage is then multiplied by a replacement rate, r, by
a redistributive factor, ￿  , by a demographic factor, ￿, and by a benefits  indexation factor, IBT.
Benefits increases result both from economic and demographic factors. Since public
pensions are an insurance against old age poverty, they redistribute income towards lower
lifetime earners. If the number of low lifetime earners rises, benefits grow disproportionately.
Also, to maintain relative benefit levels, benefits are indexed to inflation, wages, productivity, or
GDP growth. Faster growth of any of these factors lead to higher benefit payments. Finally, if
benefit payments are not adjusted to demographic changes, the fact that people live longer
should raise the total amount of benefits. Greater life expectancy is an automatic benefit increase.
Finally, changes in the benefits formula can result in growing financing needs. For
instance, the number of beneficiaries may increase as more categories of people become eligible5
or as the retirement age is lowered. Further, indexation and redistribution factors can be changed
to make the system more generous.
Economic and Demographic Changes in Reality
In theory, a number of economic factors can affect the financing needs of public
pensions. To see which factors could have had an impact on public pension finances in the
OECD, I present evidence on employment, productivity and wage growth and on inequality.
Employment Table 3 shows the rising share of the over 65-year-olds. This graying of the
population is due to low birth rates and improving life expectancies. From 1992 to 1997,
population growth was below that of the early 1970’s. In particular, fertility rates - births per
woman – have been declining everywhere from the 1970’s to the 1990’s, with the largest drop in
Japan (table 4). Also, life expectancies have increased by six years (France, Germany, Italy and
Japan), by five years (Sweden), by four years (UK) and by three years (U.S.), respectively.
* Insert table 4 here *
Demographic changes, though, only set the limits for employment growth. If employment
declines, those who bear the financial burden for public pensions may face greater demands. In
France and Italy employment relative to the working age population has declined steadily since
the 1960s (table 5), decreased somewhat in Italy, and dropped sharply in Sweden from the 1980s
to the 1990s. In comparison, employment relative to the working age population has grown in
the U.S. since the 1960s, in Japan since the 1970s, and in the UK and Germany since the 1980s.
* Insert table 5 here *
Also, employment levels vary across countries. Japan, Sweden and the U.S. all had
average employment to working age population ratios above 70% in the 1990s. In comparison,
the UK had slightly less than 70%, Germany 65%, France below 60%, and Italy 52%.
The divergence in employment rates suggests that the low levels observed in some
countries towards the end of the 1990s could possibly improve again – contrary to what is often
assumed in projections for public pension systems (Turner et al., 1998; Sinn, 1999; SSA, 2000).
First, employment levels are low by historical standards in France, Germany, and Italy. In
countries, where employment levels were high, they nevertheless continued to grow, such as in
the US, the UK and Japan. Once high employment levels are reached, they may remain high as
they did in Sweden (table 5). Thus, Italy’s employment could increase by 30 percentage points
relative to the working age population, and France’s and Germany’s by about 20 percentage
points before it reached 80%, which was the highest level in any country over the past 40 years.
Growing employment could also result from declining unemployment, from rising female
labor force participation rates, or from fewer early retirees. In 1998, German women had an
employment rate of 54%, whereas men had an employment rate of 69%. In France, the rate for
women was 54%, and for men 68%, in Italy, 37% for women and 68% for men, in the UK, 64%
for women, and 79% for men, and in Sweden, 67% for women, and 73% for men (EC, 1999).
Low labor force participation rates may be a result of a broadened application of early
retirement options. Occasionally, public pensions have substituted for unemployment benefits
(Herbertsson et al., 2000; Sinn, 1999; Blanchet and Pelé, 1997). For the EU as a whole, early
retirement may have meant a loss in potential output of more than 10% (EC, 1999b). According
to Social Security in the U.S. 19.8 million out of 27.5 million retirees received reduced6
retirement benefits because they chose early retirement (SSA, 1999). Also, in Germany, about
2.3 million out of 5.9 million retirees received retirement pensions outside the regular schedule.
German women, for example, are entitled to full retirement benefits at age 60, while the normal
retirement age for men is 65. Further, long-term unemployed workers have the option to retire
early (BfA, 2000). Under the Italian system, workers can retire before the normal retirement age
with full benefits after 35 years of service. Thus, early retirement is widespread, despite low
expenditures on separate programs (Brugiavini, 1997).
Productivity Faster increases in productivity should ease the burden of paying for the
elderly. The same dependency ratio in the future as today may put less demand on current
income if productivity and wages have grown faster than overall benefits.
There is little evidence to suggest that productivity growth will remain at low levels for
extended periods. Between 1979 and 1999, productivity growth in Germany, Italy, Japan, and
Sweden was lower than during the period from 1973 to 1979, but it accelerated in France, the
UK and the U.S. at the same time. Thus, there are no clear long-term trends towards lower
productivity growth emerging in the OECD, and there is no evidence that countries will suffer
low productivity growth rates for extended periods – as has been assumed in some projections
for future public pension finances (Turner et al., 1998; SSA, 2000).
In the long-run, wage growth should equal productivity growth. Wage growth has slowed
in the past 20 years from its previously levels everywhere, except in the U.S., where wages have
recovered some ground lost in the late 1970s. Also, in most countries wage growth has been
below productivity growth. Thus, there has been a gradual shift in national income from labor to
capital. Slower wage growth and a shift from labor income to capital income reduced the size of
the tax base relative to GDP and relative to promised benefits.
Inequality Rising or falling earnings inequality matters for public pension finances. In
particular, most systems redistribute funds to ensure that low lifetime earners receive an income
that is close to or above the national poverty threshold.
Technically, rising inequality should lead to growing financing demands on public
pensions if benefits are related to average earnings, or if taxable earnings are capped. Benefits
are generally directly connected to a worker’s earnings history. In addition, individual earnings
histories are often set in relation to average earnings. If earnings inequality increases, either the
number of people or their aggregate earnings below the average will fall. An indexation of
benefits to average earnings would thus result in an increase in benefits that is disproportionate
to contributions. On the contribution side, earnings above a certain level are often not subject to
public pension taxes. Higher earnings inequality may also mean that a growing share of
aggregate earnings come to lie above the earnings cap, thereby reducing contributions. In either
case, the financing demands on those who are contributing to public pensions grow
4.
Both earnings and income inequality appear to have grown in the 1980’s and 1990’s in
most of the seven OECD countries. For instance, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) found that
“[a]lmost all industrial economies experienced some increase in wage inequality among prime
aged males” (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997: 636). They also found that inequality grew fastest
in the UK and in the US, and the least in the Nordic countries. Other studies support some of
these findings. The exceptions with respect to earnings inequality appear to be Germany, and
possibly Italy. In comparison, the exception with respect to rising income inequality appears to
be France in the 1990s
5. Elsewhere, both earnings and income inequality appear to have grown.
In general, earnings inequality will be the more relevant aspect to consider since most
contributions come in the form of payroll taxes, and most benefits are related to earnings7
histories. Whether and how much inequality can adversely affected public pension finances
depends on the exact benefit formula of each country’s pension system.
Earnings inequality in France appears to have increased in the 1980s. For the years
between 1976 and 1987, several studies suggest rising earnings inequality (Katz, Loveman, and
Blanchflower, 1995).
There appears to be also little evidence of growing earnings inequality in Germany in the
1980s. Wage inequality has been found to remain stable throughout the 1980s (Freeman and
Katz, 1995). Also, earnings inequality has stayed the same in Germany in the 1980s (Abraham
and Houseman, 1995; Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1995).
The evidence for Italy on earnings inequality appears to be mixed. Freeman and Katz
(1995) report signs of expanding wage differentials by occupation and education in the late
1980’s in Italy. In comparison, others have found that earnings inequality remains the same for
Italy in the 1980’s (Abraham and Houseman, 1995; Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1995).
Japan’s earnings inequality appears to have grown, too. According to one study, Japanese
earnings inequality grew between 1974 and 1990 (Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1995).
Sweden is yet another country with rising earnings inequality. Earnings inequality seems
to have grown in Sweden in the 1980’s with the stronger growth of inequality in the second half
of the 1980’s than before (Edin and Holmlund, 1995).
The UK appears to be the European country with the fastest growing earnings inequality.
Wage inequality rose at double digit rates in the UK between 1979 and to 1990 (Freeman and
Katz, 1995; Katz, Loveman and Blanchflower, 1995).
Finally, the U.S. appears to be another country where earnings inequality grew sharply.
According to Freeman and Katz (1995), wage inequality rose at double digit rates – similar to the
UK - in the US between 1979 and to 1990.
Predicting the Future
While demographic and economic changes can affect the finances of public pension systems,
future trends may not warrant dire scenarios for public pension finances.
The idea that public pensions will incur a crisis depends largely on demographic
projections that are often superimposed on recent adverse economic trends. For instance, Turner
et al. (1998) assume no improvements in employment shares and continuously low productivity
growth for the U.S., Japan, and the EU. Similarly, U.S. Social Security’s trustees continue to
forecast productivity growth rates at 1.5% annually and real wage growth at 1% each year. Given
historical and international experiences, these figures appear unduly pessimistic (table 6).
* Insert table 6 here *
Assumptions that labor force participation rates will remain constant at their low levels
for the next 50 years (Turner et al., 1998) appears unduly pessimistic. Considering the labor
market situation in the OECD countries there seems to be room for employment to grow. First,
employment levels are low by historical standards in France, Germany, and Italy. Second,
employment levels continued to grow in the US, the UK and Japan even after relatively high
levels at or above 65% of the working age population had been reached. Similarly, employment
levels remained high in Sweden (table 5). If we assume that the rate of workers to the working
age population reaches its maximum around 80% - the highest level for any country during the
past 40 years - Italy’s employment could increase by 30 percentage points relative to the working
age population, and France’s and Germany’s by about 20 percentage points.8
To illustrate the impact different assumptions on projections for public pensions, I
calculate a ratio of the elderly to current workers that is adjusted for employment and
productivity growth
6 - the Care for the Aged and Retired by Employees Ratio (CARER). I
calculate CARER to gain a tool for a cross-country comparison of each country’s ability to pay
for its public pension system. To facilitate cross-country comparisons, I have indexed CARER to
2000 and treat each public pension system as if it were a pay-as-you-go system
7.
For ease of comparison of each country’s ability to pay, I make a few simplifying
assumptions. First, I assume that everybody over the age of 65 is a beneficiary. As all countries
offer retirement, disability and survivorship benefits in addition to a minimum or poverty
pension, few people over the normal retirement are not covered by public pensions. Second,
differences in the normal retirement age are therefore ignored. Since rapid changes in the normal
retirement age are rare, this assumption may understate the level of the dependency ratio, but not
the changes of it. Third, I ignore the redistributive characteristics of public pension systems.
Since income inequality has increased in almost every country, this assumption is likely to
understate the burden of caring for future retirees. However, this is partially offset by calculating
benefit increases on the basis of average wage growth. Increasing income inequality suggests
below average earnings growth for low income earners, who benefit the most from public
pension redistribution. Thus, including average wage growth - equal to productivity growth – as
a measure of benefits increases means that I am likely overstating benefits increases
8.
One characteristic of each country’s public pension system that is included in the
calculations, is the indexation method. Most countries index their benefits to price increases after
retirement (France, Italy, Sweden, the UK and the U.S.). In comparison, Germany and Japan
index their benefits to after tax wages
9.
The changes in CARER are subsequently used to calculate after tax wage increases over
the next fifty years as a measure of future living standards. Both the expected burden to care for
the elderly, and the changes in future living standards help us to answer two questions. First,
both measures can be used to discover how sensitive future projections are to the underlying
assumptions, and second, they can be employed to analyze whether each country can afford a
pay-as-you-go public pension system.
Table 7 calculates the burden of caring for the elderly and the resulting after-tax wages
on the basis of each country’s experience during the past twenty years. After adjusting for
changes in employment and productivity gains, the burden of caring for the elderly increases in
three countries and declines in the other four. The decline in the burden of caring for the elderly
falls between 20% (France) and 52% (Sweden and the U.S.). In comparison, increases in the
burden of caring for the elderly range from 25% in Japan to 40% in Germany.
* Insert table 7 here *
Even where the burden of caring for the elderly is expected to increase, living standards
are likely to grow. After tax wages are more than twice as high in six out of seven countries in
2050, and two thirds higher than in 2000 in Italy.
The experience of the past 20 years, however, appears rather pessimistic and may hence
underestimate the future economic performance of the seven OECD economies. With the
exception of the U.S., the average productivity growth rate for the past 40 years has been higher
than for the past 20 years. Further, the rate of change of the ratio of employment to the working9
age population for the past 20 years has been rather similar to that of the past 40 years, with the
exception of Japan (table 8).
* Insert table 8 here *
Given the different set of assumptions that is based on long-term historical experiences,
the forecasts for the burden of caring for the elderly and for after tax wages become more
optimistic. The burden of caring for the elderly is expected to still increase in two countries –
Germany and Japan. However, CARER actually decreases in the last ten years in Japan. Only in
Germany does CARER seem to be unaffected by the different set of assumptions. However,
because of the largely more optimistic outlook on the economy, the forecasts in table 8 suggest
more than a tripling of after tax wages in France, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the UK after 50 years.
In Germany, after tax wages are expected to increase by 184%, and in the U.S. by 130%.
Table 9 summarizes the changes, which indicate that with the exception of Germany and
the U.S. the long-range assumptions lead to lower forecasted burdens of caring for the elderly
than the short-range assumptions. In Germany, a change in the underlying assumptions appears
to have little effect on the burden of caring for the elderly, while the less optimistic assumptions
lead to a higher burden in the U.S. case, as one would expect.
* Insert table 9 here *
The calculations have so far combined changes in two underlying assumptions at the
same time, productivity growth and growth in the ratio of employment to the working age
population. Table 10 records the impact of alternative assumptions about productivity growth
and employment growth separately. As a baseline scenario, I assume – similar to the OECD
studies - that each economy’s productivity grows initially at 1.4% annually, and that employment
to working age population remains unchanged. First, I increase annual productivity growth to
2%, then I raise employment growth relative to the working age population by 0.4% annually,
and finally, I change both assumptions at the same time.
* Insert table 10 here *
Higher productivity growth translates into a lower burden of caring for the elderly in six
countries. The only exception here is Germany, where higher productivity growth has no effect
on caring for the elderly. In countries, where benefits are indexed to inflation, an increase in
annual productivity growth from 1.4% to 2.0% results in a decline of the burden of caring for the
elderly by 25% to 34% over 50 years.
The impact of faster employment growth is ambiguous. In three countries, France,
Germany and the U.S., the burden of caring for the elderly declines, whereas it increases in the
other four countries. The ambiguity in the effect of increasing employment can be explained with
the fact that higher employment also leads to increases in future benefit payments.
The combined effects of higher productivity growth and faster employment growth result
in a declining CARER for all countries. Put differently, the productivity gains are more than
offset by the growing demands on Italy’s public pension system from increases in the number of
future retirees. Further, the combined gains in CARER from faster productivity and employment10
growth are smallest in Japan (3.4%) and Germany (8.2%), where benefits are indexed to after tax
wage increases.
The effects of different economic assumptions vary with the indexation of benefits. Thus,
table 11 calculates the changes resulting from a switch in the indexation method given 1.4%
productivity growth and no change in the ratio of employment to the working age population.
Switching from a price indexation to an after-tax wage indexation means a benefit increase, and
therefore increases CARER by about 80% to 90% in all five countries (France, Italy, Sweden,
the UK and the U.S.) after 50 years. In comparison, switching from an after-tax wage or GDP
indexation to a price indexation in Germany and Japan lowers CARER by 46% over 50 years.
* Insert table 11 here *
Another change in the level of benefits that has entered the debate in some OECD
countries is a decrease in the retirement age
10. Several countries, such as France or Germany,
have already used de facto lower retirement ages to combat persistently high unemployment
levels. What would happen to public pension finances if the hypothetical retirement age were
lowered? To illustrate the impact of a lower retirement age, I reduce the retirement age in a linear
fashion by 0.2 years each year for the next 25 years, and increase the number of retirees and
lower the number of people in the working age population.
By definition, a lower retirement age increases the burden for current workers to care for
the elderly. The increase is largest in Italy with its most rapidly changing demographics, and
smallest in the U.S., which is also the country with the highest population growth rate and the
youngest population among the seven OECD countries. The impact of a lower retirement age is a
CARER that is between 11% and 38% higher than with a normal retirement age of 65.
By looking at two possible benefit increases, higher indexation and lower retirement age,
and connecting these to the resulting after tax wages, we can gauge not only whether benefit
increases are affordable, but also demonstrate that there is little to worry about. If a public
pension system can afford benefit increases – when so desired by policymakers - , there is little
grounds to assert that its future is in jeopardy. In the four countries, where the indexation is
changed from prices to after tax wages, after tax wages of workers are still about twice as high in
2050 as they are in 2000. Further, with a lower retirement age, after tax wages are 73% to 110%
higher in 2050 than in 2000. Benefit increases are possible, if policymakers are willing to
increases tax rates, which should result in slower growth of after tax wages than otherwise, but
growth of after tax wages nevertheless.
My simulations are merely indications of broad trends. They illustrate the sensitivity of
future projections to what often appears like marginal differences in the underlying assumptions.
Further, the scenarios speak directly to the claim that public pension systems in the OECD are
going to be in a crisis. Even if we use the most pessimistic assumptions, the simulations do not
spiral out of control. Quite the contrary, even with pessimistic assumptions, benefit increases
appear affordable, if policymakers are willing to introduce them.
My projections take each country’s system’s characteristics only to a limited degree into
account. Nevertheless, my simulations provide a sense of each country’s ability to pay for the
elderly. This ability to pay should not be confused with the willingness of policy makers to
implement the necessary changes. Despite an improving ability to pay for the elderly, tax
increases may be necessary. Some factors that require higher tax rates may not be connected to11
economic trends, but to policy decisions. The following section provides therefore a description
of the designs of public pension systems.
Country Experiences with Public and Private Pensions
The discussion over the future of public pension systems has helped to generate a sense
of crisis among policy makers and increasingly among the public. It seems that the greater the
sense of crisis becomes, the less willing policymakers may be to consider changing the structures
of public pension systems, so that they may take advantage of the possibly greater ability to pay
for public pensions in the future. Thus, considering privatization appears as a viable solution to
perceived problems of public pensions. Hence, we consider existing private pension systems in
each country in the following discussion.
The French Experience with Public and Private Pensions
The French public retirement system offers a variety of co-existing schemes, all of which
are on a pay-as you-go (PAYG) basis. For private sector employees, there are two public
pensions, the general regime and complementary schemes.
Changes to the French retirement system have been implemented on occasion since the
early 1970’s (table 12). Most notable are increased replacement ratios and the affiliation of
homemakers. On the other hand, benefit cuts have come as extensions of the years required for
maximum benefits and as expansions of the years over which average earnings are calculated.
* Insert table 12 here *
Approximately 65% of all workers are eligible for the defined benefits of the general
scheme, which was created in 1945. In addition, roughly 180 complementary schemes exist,
based on occupation, that belong to one of two federations. AGIRC manages pensions for
workers in executive and managerial positions for the portion of their income that is above the
income cap of the general scheme. ARRCO handles pensions for all other workers, and for the
part of managerial and executive wages that are below the cap. Even though complementary
schemes were created between 1946 and the mid-1960’s, participation did not become
mandatory until 1972 (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997). There are also approximately 120 specialized
systems (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997). These are pensions for the self-employed and for public
sector employees, and they remain outside the public pension system. Finally, 1 million retirees
in 1997 received means tested minimum pensions, down from 2.55 million in 1959 (CGP, 1995).
Public pension contributions are collected mainly as payroll taxes. Taxes for the general
system amount to an employee contribution of 6.55% of pensionable earnings, and to 0.1% of
total earnings for surviving spouse’s benefits. The employer pays an additional 8.2% of covered
wages plus 1.6% of total wages (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997; SSA, 1999). For the complementary
schemes, payroll taxes are 2% on income up to three times the income ceiling for non-
managerial workers. Managerial workers pay 2% for the income that is below the income
ceiling, and 4.68% above the income ceiling as long as it is below four times the ceiling. In 1994,
the actual contribution rates for complementary schemes were calculated by multiplying the tax
rates by a factor of 1.25 (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997).
All benefits are defined benefits based on an individual’s earnings history. General
benefits are based on the eleven to 25 highest income years - depending on the year of birth -, on
years of contribution up to a maximum of 37.5, and on age at retirement. The replacement ratio
amounts to 50% of average wages of 25 best years as of January 01, 2008 (SSA, 1999). For each
quarter that a retiree is shy of the maximum of 37.5 years, the replacement rate of a worker’s12
highest ten year average is reduced by 1.25% in addition to a penalty for contributing less than
the maximum years. Similarly, for each quarter that a worker is shy of age 65 the replacement
rate is reduced by 1.25%. In cases, where workers are younger than 65 and have contributed less
than 37.5 years, the higher retirement income is chosen. Benefits are indexed to prices or average
wages on a discretionary basis (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997). In the complementary system, workers
earn “points” towards their pension benefit, which are accumulated relative to contributions. The
pension is ultimately equal to the total number of points collected multiplied by a variable
coefficient. There is no preset replacement rate for the complementary system.
Since 1963, French workers have the option to retire early. Between 1963 and 1972, early
retirement was used as an income support for older workers who had been affected by mass lay-
offs (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997). Since 1972, this system was replaced with a more general
program that was intended to provide 60-70% of one’s income to workers who had lost their job
at age 60 or older. When the normal retirement age was lowered to 60 in 1983, its impact was
small as most workers had already taken early retirement (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997).
Workers have other early retirement options. First, there are negotiated benefits under the
National Fund for Employment that can result from negotiations between the employer and the
government. Second, there are unemployment benefits for workers 58 years old or over to help
them make the transition to retirement (Blanchet and Pelé, 1997).
The French public pension system also offers means tested spousal benefits, disability
pensions for workers under the age of 60, and survivorship benefits if the surviving spouse is
over 55, or for children of the deceased.
Since public pensions offer relatively generous benefits as indicated by comparatively
high replacement ratios, private pensions are rare in France
11 (Davis, 1994). Only a small
number of firms offer group-insured plans for executives, or what is referred to as top-hat plans.
These could be either defined benefit or defined contribution plans.
The German Experience with Public and Private Pensions
The public pension system is separate from the government, but subsidized by the
government. Originally designed as fully funded disability insurance in 1889, it eventually
turned into a PAYG system when the Great Depression and WWII affected its finances.
Over the decades, there have been several reforms. In 1972, the government expanded
benefits by introducing early retirement benefits and average before tax wage indexation instead
of inflation. The 1992 pension reform introduced benefit cuts by changing indexation to after tax
wages, by raising the normal retirement age for women from 60 to 65 in 2004 (table 13), and by
lowering the replacement rate from 70% to 64% over time (Sinn, 1999). Finally, in 1999, it was
proposed to index benefits to inflation for two years, and to after tax wages thereafter.
* Insert table 13 here *
Payroll taxes cover 80% of benefits, while the government covers the rest out of general
revenues (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1997; BfA, 2000). Combined tax rates – split evenly
between employer and employee - have been between 18% and 20% since 1973 on earnings
below an income cap. Since the income ceiling is indexed to average wage growth the tax base
has become wider over time.
Pension benefits are generous. They offer an average replacement rate of 71% of average
after tax wages, based on a worker’s earnings. After retirement benefits are indexed to average
after tax wages. To calculate benefits, a worker’s contributions are indexed to annual average13
contributions, which are then averaged over the full working life. In 1972, a floor of 75% of
average contributions for benefit calculations was introduced, thereby lifting the averages for
low lifetime earners. The 1993 reform eliminated the floor. For workers whose contributions are
below 50% of average contributions, contributions below 75% of average contributions are
multiplied by a factor of 1.5 up to a ceiling of 75%. Further, benefits are based on years of
services, which include years of no contributions, such as unemployment, military service, or
years spent in school. To combat high unemployment, the eligibility for benefits has been
widened, especially by expanding early retirement (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1997).
Early retirement has become a popular option. Following the 1973 reform, which made it
possible to retire early with full benefits, the average retirement age declined from age 63 to 58.5
(Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1997). Early retirement incentives also led to a sharp drop in labor
force participation rates in East Germany immediately following unification. In particular, labor
force participation rates in East Germany declined from 56.9% in 1990 to 37.4% in 1992, which
is attributed largely to generous early retirement benefits (Börsch-Supan and Schmidt, 1996).
German workers have different options for retiring early. Out of 5.9 million retirees in
1999, 1.1 million were women, who were entitled to full retirement benefits earlier than men. A
little over half a million retirees received retirement benefits because of unemployment (BfA,
2000). Further, Börsch-Supan and Schnabel (1997) report that at age 59, about 45% of men
consider themselves retired, half of whom have taken advantage of early retirement options, and
the other half because they qualify for disability benefits. Other than regular retirement options,
workers can also use unemployment benefits after age 56 as early retirement income or as
subsidized support from their employers after age 58 (Börsch-Supan and Schnabel, 1997).
In addition to retirement pensions, Germany’s system offers also disability benefits of at
least two-thirds of the applicable old-age pension. Further, survivorship benefits are paid at 60%
of the spouse’s applicable old age pension if children are present and 25% if not.
Even though a large share of employees receives private pensions, these are relatively
small. Only 5% of a typical household’s retirement income come from employment based
private sources (Börsch-Supan et al., 2000). The fact that German workers receive few pension
benefits from their employers results from the generosity of public pensions on the one hand, and
from provisions of private pensions that keep the risks associated with them largely with the
employer. Most private pensions are defined benefits, and companies are legally mandated to
index benefits. Pension coverage has declined from 70% to 66% in the 1980’s (Davis, 1994).
There are four types of private pensions (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1984; Ahrend, 1996,
Davis, 1994). Direct commitments are the largest one, which appear on the balance sheets of
companies. In 1991, direct commitments – valued at DM 240 billion – were 60% of pension
liabilities. They are insured in case a firm goes bankrupt, and since 1987, provisions for
otherwise unfunded liabilities have been mandatory. Contributions are tax free, they earn 6%
nominally, and can only be invested within the firm. Second, external pensions exist, and about
10% of pensions are in the form of direct insurance, where a firm contracts with a life insurer on
behalf of its employees (Davis, 1994). Investment risks are borne by the insurer and investments
are governed by insurance regulations. Third, a company may set up a separate pension fund or a
support fund. In 1991, pension funds held 20% of all pension liabilities, and support funds held
an additional 10% (Davis, 1994). While pension funds are similar to those elsewhere, support
funds are set up as mutual insurances to handle a company’s pension scheme. The portfolio
choices of pension funds are limited (see table 12), while those of support funds are not. Finally,
special security funds have become increasingly relevant. These are investment companies that14
allow highly liquid companies that have direct commitments on their balance sheets to invest
part of their pension provisions in the capital markets (Davis, 1994).
The Italian Experience with Public and Private Pensions
Italy’s public pensions date back to 1889 when pensions for members of the army were
introduced. By the 1960’s, a variety of public pension schemes existed. For instance, the
“National Institute for Social Security – INPS” collected mandatory contributions from a large
part of private sector employees and from some self-employed. Subsequently, the INPS and the
Public Sector Employees Fund became the main branches of Italy’s public pension system. Also,
several occupations set up their own funds, guided by their own rules.
Italy’s system has been changed several times in the past (Brugiavini, 1997). In 1969,
funding was switched to a PAYG, benefits were based on “final salary”, a means-tested
minimum pension for uncovered workers was introduced, benefits became inflation indexed, and
early retirement for private sector employees with at least 35 years of service was offered. In
1976, pensions became indexed to real wage growth. In 1984, requirements for disability
benefits were tightened. In 1989, the redistributive aspects of the benefits formula were
weakened. In 1992, the amount that a worker could earn without loss of retirement benefits was
lowered, the reference period for average wages was lengthened, the minimum requirement was
raised, increase in the retirement age for men and women. Also, a reform in 1995 eliminated the
earnings cap on benefits, benefits were indexed to inflation. Finally, in 1997 the harmonization
of public sector pensions to private sector pensions was accelerated, and the harmonization of
special schemes to private sector pensions was introduced (OECD, 2000).
Revenues are mainly payroll taxes. In 1998, the employee contribution amounted to
8.89% of earnings up to an income threshold, and of 9.9% of earnings beyond that threshold,
while the employer contribution was at 23.81% of payroll. The government covered any shortfall
of contributions in the form of lump-sum subsidies for the past decades.
Benefits are computed on the basis of age, years of service, and earnings. Workers who
entered the workforce after 1996 become eligible at 57 with at least 5 years of contributions.
With less than 19 years of coverage, men are eligible at 65 and women at 60 (SSA, 1999).
Private sector employees can collect full benefits at 55 and 35 years of service. Under current
law, there are three benefits calculations. For new entrants after 1996, pensions are based on
accumulated contributions multiplied by an age varying coefficient ranging from 4.72 at age 57
to 6.136 at age 65. Second, if a worker has less than 19 years of contributions, benefits are based
on progressive percentage between 0.9 and 2 percent of salary times years of contributions, while
years after 1995 are calculated in the same way as they are for new entrants. Third, for workers
with more than 19 years of contributions in 2000, benefit calculations are based on progressive
percentage ranging from 0.9 to 2 percent of salary times years of contributions (SSA, 1999).
There are other benefits. Since 1977, survivorship benefits include widow/widower
benefits, children and other dependents. Workers who have contributed for at least five years are
also eligible for disability benefits.
Italy is another country, where private pensions have played a relatively small role. They
are mostly supplements to public pensions, and can take different forms as there is no law on
private pensions. There are book entries similar to Germany’s direct commitments, separate
pension funds, or pension funds within a firm. Additionally, companies can set up tax-free
severance funds that are book reserves (Davis, 1994). However, if the firm goes bankrupt, the
worker bears the risk of loss of retirement income.
The Swedish Experience with Public and Private Pensions15
Sweden implemented its first compulsory, fully funded old-age pension system in 1913.
It consisted of a means-tested basic pension and a supplementary pension relative to a worker’s
earnings, and covered everybody, not just workers. In 1935, the system switched to a PAYG
system, funding switched to employers’ contributions, and benefit levels increased (Palme and
Svensson, 1997). The minimum pension increased from about 11.3% of earnings of an industrial
worker in 1913 to 29.4% in 1941. The minimum pension was replaced with the basic pension in
1946. Based on a referendum in 1959, compulsory supplementary pensions were introduced. In
1976, the mandatory retirement age was lowered from 67 to 65. A survivor’s benefit was
introduced in 1990 to replace the widow’s pension.
Sweden changed its system in 1998 (Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 1998). Now,
pensions are based on lifetime income, the combined tax rate is 18.5% of a worker’s lifetime
average income, split between employer and employee, of which 16% pay for benefits and 2.5%
go into an individual retirement account. Benefits from the PAYG system are indexed to real
income growth, and adjusted for life expectancy. In addition to the new pension system, there is
also a guaranteed pension as a supplement for low lifetime earners.
In the old system, employer contributions and government subsidies finance most of the
system. In 1999, the contribution rate for the national basic pension amounted to 5.86% of
payroll for employers, and to 1% of assessable income for employees. 25% of the costs were
covered by the government. There is no income ceiling for contributions.
For workers covered under the old system, benefits are based on the basic amount (BA).
Everybody is entitled to a full basic pension if they have lived in Sweden for 40 years, or worked
there for 30 years. The basic pension for a single pensioner is 96% of the BA and 78.5% for a
married worker. Pensioners who are not covered by the supplementary scheme are also entitled
to a special supplement, equal to 55.5% of the BA. The share of income that exceeds the BA
determines supplementary pension benefits. Three years of income greater than the BA are
required to qualify for supplementary benefits. Income that exceeds 7.5 times the BA is not
counted for benefits calculations. For income that is above the BA and equal to one time the BA,
a worker earns one pension point up to a maximum of 6.5 points per year. The average points of
the best 15 years are taken and multiplied by a factor of 0.6, by the BA, and by the number of
service years relative to a maximum of 30 years. If a worker has earned 30 years of service, she
receives a replacement ratio of 60% of her best 15 years (below the income cap). Benefits are
nowadays indexed to inflation (Palme and Svensson, 1997). Everybody receives the basic
pension, and there are no benefits for dependents under the supplementary scheme.
Early retirement is an option for workers between the ages of 61 and 65. Under the new
system early retirement benefits are actuarially fair reductions of full benefits at the normal
retirement age (Herbertsson et al., 2000). Labor force participation rates for men between the
ages of 60 and 64 have continuously declined form a high of about 85% in 1964 to close to 60%
in 1996 (Palme and Svensson, 1997). In contrast, labor force participation rates for women
between the ages of 60 and 64 have increase from about 35% to 45% in the early 1990s, before
dropping to about 40% in the wake of the Swedish recession.
The old system offers also survivorship, disability, and early retirement benefits. The
basic pension offers survivorship benefits of 90% of the BA for women born before 1945. For
everybody born after 1945, survivorship benefits replace the old widow’s pensions. Under the
supplementary scheme, widow benefits for women born before 1945 offer 35% or 40% of a
deceased worker’s pension until the normal retirement age of 65. Since 1997, all survivors
receive 20% of the deceased spouse’s pension if there are children entitled to a children’s16
pension, and 40% otherwise. Further, disability benefits consist of the basic and the
supplementary pension. Calculation of disability benefits is the same as for pension benefits at
full retirement age. Finally, both basic and supplementary pensions can be claimed as early as
age 60. The monthly benefit is reduced by 0.5% for each month of early withdrawal.
In addition to its complementary fully funded pensions, Sweden also has numerous
private pensions, which are arranged through the collective bargaining process. Every worker is
covered by one of the plans. White-collar workers are covered by the ITP and blue collar
workers are covered by the STP. Funding for the ITP comes from book reserves, insurance
contracts or contracts with a special pension company, whereas the STP plan is offered only
through a mutual insurance organization (Davis, 1994).
The private pensions offer only a small addition in retirement income with a replacement
ratio of roughly 10-15% of the final wage. Up to 1998, investments were limited to insurance
companies, mainly in the life insurer SPP for the ITP and the AMF System for blue-collar
workers. Both SPP and ITP are now allowed to invest in domestic shares. Since 1998, workers
can decide where to allocate their pension assets and who will manage the funds.
The UK Experience with Public and Private Pensions
Retirees in the UK only receive a small fraction of their retirement income from public
pensions. The basic state pension amounted to 16% of male average earnings in 1996 (Blundell
and Johnson, 1997). Introduced in 1906, the basic pension offers a flat rate benefit, that is an
earned benefit and paid for by payroll taxes. In 1978, a supplementary scheme, the State
Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS), was introduced. It had originally a target benefit
level equal to 25% of average wage-indexed lifetime earnings. Changes introduced to SERPS in
1986 and 1995 reduced the benefits payable under the supplementary program from 25% to 20%
of wages, which was supposed to result in lower tax rates (CBO, 1999).
Contributions for the basic pension and the SERPS amount to a maximum marginal rate
of 21.6% in 1999 (SSA, 1999) with employees contributing 10% up to the upper earnings limit
and employers contributing 12.2% depending on a worker’s earnings. Employers can opt out of
the SERPS by providing similar private market alternatives, thereby lowering their contribution
rates to 9.6% to 11.6%.
“Perhaps the most important feature of the basic pension system is its low level”
(Blundell and Johnson, 1997: 19). In 1996, it represented 16% of average male earnings, down
from about 20% in the 1970’s. Since it is indexed to the Retail Price Index, it is expected to
continue to fall to 7% or 8% of average male earnings by 2030. To receive the full basic pension
only past contributions and age matter. 44 years of contributions are required for men and 39
years of contributions for women (rising to 44 when the normal retirement age becomes the same
in 2020) at the normal retirement age, which is 65 for men and 60 for women. The basic pension
offers also spousal benefits and survivorship benefits, but there is no early retirement provision.
There is, however, the option of deferral for up to five years with each year of deferral earning a
7.5% increase. Further, there is also a means-tested supplementary Income Support that offers a
higher pension benefit than the basic pension for low income pensioners. In 1997, 1.5 million out
of 10 million pensioners relied on this minimum pension (Blundell and Johnson, 1997).
Early retirement is not an option in the UK. However, about 43 percent of males between
the ages of 60 and 64 receive some form of benefits. The highest incidence rate of benefits
before the normal retirement age comes from invalidity benefits, which 25% of males received in
1994/95, followed by income support – or poverty pensions, which went to 17% of males, and
10% of males received other health related benefits (Blundell and Johnson, 1997).17
The SERPS was introduced in 1978. Its benefits are relative to a worker’s earnings.
Earnings are counted above a lower earnings limit and below an upper earnings limit, with all
other earnings not counted. Both upper and lower limits are indexed to inflation. Relevant
earnings are indexed by average earnings in each year up to the year where the beneficiary
reaches pensionable age. From the average of the indexed earnings the lower earnings limit is
subtracted. The resulting difference is then multiplied by an accrual factor, and by the
contribution years. Similar to the basic pension, SERPS offers survivorship benefits equal to
50% of the worker’s pension, and a disability pension, but no early retirement option.
If a worker is covered under an employment related scheme with certain benefits, the
worker can give up rights to SERPS. Since 1988 traditional occupational schemes and Personal
Pension schemes could contract out of SERPS. 75% of eligible workers are not covered by
SERPS, 2/3 of which are in occupational schemes, and 1/3 in Personal Pension schemes.
There is a heavy reliance on private pensions. Only 44% of retirement income come from
the basic pension, which is expected to decline to 28% in 2025 (OFT, 1997). An additional 4%
of benefits came from SERPS in 1994, which is expected to grow to 16% in 2025 (OFT, 1997).
More than half of an average worker’s retirement benefit comes from occupational schemes –
with employer contributions - and personal pension savings – without employer contributions
12.
50% of all workers are covered by an occupational scheme, and 20% by personal pension plans.
While 60% of male workers are covered by an occupational scheme, only 35% of female
workers are covered. Further, all public sector employees are covered by occupational schemes,
but only 59% of private sector (Davis, 1994). While the pension coverage is unequally
distributed, the coverage level has been constant since 1967 (Davis, 1994).
All public sector employees and most private sector workers receive a defined benefit,
sometimes even with indexation provisions. Defined benefit plans became less attractive for
employers due to high inflation and low returns in the mid-1970s. From 1971 to 1981,
employers’ contributions to private pensions grew from 1.75% to 3.23% of GDP to cover
shortfalls in defined benefit plans. Their finances improved, so that employers’ contributions
dropped to 2% of GDP in 1987, and to 1.22% in 1992 (Davis, 1994).
In the early 1990’s, defined contribution plans and individual retirement savings schemes
have become more popular. A survey of employers found a clear preference for them when
establishing a new plan (CBI, 1994). Reasons for this preference are that the risks are borne by
the employee, that at least for smaller employers there is a cost advantage in setting up defined
contribution plans over defined benefit plans, and that more employment contracts are
contingent, and short-term (OFT, 1997). In 1993, 3% of all workers were covered by an
occupational defined contribution plan, but 19% of workers working for small firms were
covered by such plans (Davis, 1994). Also, OFT (1997) reports that survey evidence suggests
that there is a steady increase in defined contribution plans, especially in smaller firms.
The Japanese Experience with Public and Private Pensions
The Japanese public pension system dates back to 1942, when a pension insurance was
established. The current system with two pillars for pensions was created in 1961. One pillar
covers self-employed workers and unpaid workers, the other covers both public and private
sector employees. The employee pension consists of a basic pension that is also offered to the
self-employed and to unpaid workers and an earnings related pension (Oshio and Yashiro, 1997).
Basic pensions offer the main public retirement benefit to the self-employed. Benefits
paid are a flat amount and are unrelated to a worker’s earnings. It is paid for from a flat Yen18
amount each worker contributes per month. The basic pension does not offer spousal or
survivorship benefits, but it does offer a disability pension.
The earnings related system is managed by eight plans covering different occupations,
with the largest one, the Kosei Nenkin Hoken (KNH), covering roughly 85% of all employees.
Contributions to KNH are split evenly between employers and employees for a combined tax
rate of 16.5% in 1995. The Japanese public pension schemes are partially funded systems as they
hold government securities. Hence, additional funds come from interest on government debt on
top of government transfers equal to third of benefits and expenses.
Benefits are based on earnings and on the age of the worker. At retirement age, normally
65, the worker’s wages are converted into standard average monthly earnings using a scale of
currently thirty brackets. After conversion, a worker’s earnings are averaged over the entire
career since there is no minimum or maximum of years. The target replacement ratio was revised
in 1994 to slightly lower than 30% of monthly wages by 2025, down from 60%. Also, indexation
was changed from price indexation to net wage indexation in 1994.
Additionally, the KNH offers benefits for dependents at flat rates for spouses and
children under the age of 18. Also, dependent spouses are entitled to their own basic benefits in
addition to spousal benefits under the supplementary earnings related plan.
The supplementary system also offers early retirement, survivorship, and disability
benefits. Workers between the ages of 60 and 65 can retire early, and their pensions are subject
to an earnings test. Further, surviving spouses and other dependents receive 75% of the deceased
worker’s full benefit beginning at age 60. Finally, workers can receive disability benefits after
the age of 20, which are calculated similar to pension benefits with an additional 25% available
for severe disabilities. Alternatively, a disabled worker can choose to collect a flat amount.
Early retirement is an option at age 60. Early retirement benefits are dependent on the
worker meeting certain earnings criteria. Even a minimal amount of earnings reduces early
retirement benefits by 20%. A fair number of people, though, opt to leave the labor force at age
60. In 1990, labor force participation rates for women declined with age from a high of 70% for
45-year-old women to a little over 40% for 60-year-olds. Similarly, labor force participation
rates for men dropped from close to 100% for 45-year-olds to about 85% for 60-year-olds and to
about 65% for 65-year-olds (Oshio and Yashiro, 1997).
Public pensions offer a small basic benefit. Yet, private pension schemes are still rare.
There are three private pension systems, which are all defined benefit plans. Since 1962, tax
qualified pension plans (TQPP) have been allowed for firms with fifteen or more employees. By
1989, TQPPs covered 28% of private sector employees, and held $76bn in assets (Davis, 1994).
Second, since 1966 employees’ pension funds (EPFs) have been introduced for firms with 500 or
more employees. The advantage of EPFs to employers results from the option to contract out of
the earnings-related public pension portion, though benefits from EPFs have to be in excess of
30% of public pensions. By 1989, EPFs covered 26% of the workforce and held assets to the
tune of $143bn. Trust banks or life insurance companies handle fund management of private
pensions in Japan. Trust banks control 60% of all pension assets, and life insurers the remaining
40%. Third, Japanese firms carry unfunded retirement bonuses as liabilities on their books.
The American Experience with Public and Private Pensions
The U.S. Social Security was established in 1935. Originally, all workers in commerce
and industry, with the exception of railroads were covered. Its coverage has gradually grown.
Only some state and local employees may not be included (Diamond and Gruber, 1997).19
Social Security’s structure has changed over the years. Early retirement benefits for
women between the ages of 62 and 65 were offered in 1956 and for men in 1961. Benefits for
dependents and widows were introduced in 1939, and for widowers and dependent husbands in
1950. In 1973, Social Security’s benefits were indexed to inflation, and average lifetime wages
were indexed by average wages. Finally, in 1983, a gradual increase in the normal retirement age
from 65 to 67 in effect for workers reaching age 62 in 2022 or later was implemented.
Contributions to Social Security come from combined payroll taxes amounting to 12.4%,
which are evenly split between employers and employees, up to an income ceiling. Also, Social
Security earns interest on a portfolio of government securities.
Benefits are based on age and earnings. To calculate benefits, a worker’s earnings are
indexed by average wages. The 35 highest earnings years are subsequently averaged, and build
the basis for a redistributive replacement formula, whereby a three-piece linear progressive
schedule is applied. Thus, there is a declining replacement ratio as average lifetime earnings go
up. After retirement benefits are adjusted each year for price increases. Dependent benefits
amount to 50% of the worker’s benefits for spouses, as well as for children up to a family
maximum of roughly 175% of the worker’s benefit.
U.S. workers are eligible for early retirement benefits at the age of 62. If a worker
chooses to retire early, her benefits are reduced in an actuarially fair manner by 6 and 2/3 % for
each year that a worker retires early. Thus, a 62 year old receives 20% less than she would have
if she had continued to work to the normal retirement age at 65. Most U.S. workers retire early.
In 1998, 19.2 million out of 27.5 million retirees received reduced retirement benefits because
they retired before the normal retirement age (SSA, 1999).
The system also offers a low income pension. The Supplemental Security Income
program offers income support for low income elderly and disabled individuals based on their
relative income compared to the rest of the population.
Additional benefits of Social Security include early retirement, dependent, survivor
benefits, and disability benefits. Early retirement is available at age 62 with a reduction by 5/9 of
one percent per month in the primary insurance amount to which the progressive replacement
schedule is applied. Also, surviving spouses receive 100% of a worker’s benefits beginning at
age 60. Finally, disability benefits offer workers full benefits based on their earnings record.
The U.S. is another country where private pensions have traditionally played an
important role in the provision of retirement income. At the end of 1998, financial assets of
pension funds amounted to roughly $8 trillion (BoG, 1999). While 39% of all workers had a
defined benefit plan as their primary plan in 1975, only 23% did so in 1995. In contrast, the
percentage of full and part-time private sector workers who were covered by a defined
contribution plan rose from 6% in 1975 to 23% in 1995 (DoL, 1999). Further, while 91% of
private sector full time workers at medium and large firms were covered by some form of a
retirement plan in 1985, only 79% were in 1997(BLS, 1999). The percent of workers enrolled in
defined benefit plans declined from 80% in 1985 to 50% in 1997, and coverage by defined
contribution plans grew from 53% to 57% over the same period. Finally, less than half of all full
time workers in small firms are covered by any form of retirement benefit. The share enrolled in
defined benefit plans declined from 20% in 1990 to 15% in 1996, whereas the share enrolled in
defined contribution plans grew from 31% to 41%.
Comparison of OECD Experiences with Public and Private Pensions
Public pension systems that have helped to provide income support for the elderly have
faced growing financing needs. Both economic and policy changes have resulted in rising20
expenditures relative to GDP and higher tax rates. In recent years, employment growth has been
low or even negative, productivity and wage growth have been sluggish and inequality has risen.
Assuming that all of these trends will continue or possibly even get worse in the medium
to long-term seems unrealistic. However, proponents of the theory that public pensions will
inevitably end up in crisis base their scenarios on the assumption that all adverse trends we have
observed in the recent past, will continue over the next 50 years (Turner et al., 1998). If we
assume even marginally better economic scenarios, the forecasts of looming crises often become
much less pronounced or even disappear (Turner et al., 1998; Baker and Weisbrot, 1999).
Due to the design of public pension systems in all seven countries, the adverse economic
trends could have given rise to greater financing needs everywhere. Demographic changes could
have contributed to more severe financial constraints of public pension systems if they had direct
impacts on employment growth. In particular, none of the seven countries has had a demographic
factor in their benefits formulas that would link benefit payments to either demographic or
employment changes. Only Sweden has introduced a demographic factor into its benefits
formula when it reformed its public pension system in 1998.
It is important to keep in mind that demographic changes only set the parameters for
employment growth. With respect to the changes in the share of employment relative to the
population, the demographic trends are not necessarily reflected. In some countries, France and
Italy, employment’s share of the working age population has declined steadily since the 1960s.
In comparison, employment as share of the working age population has continuously increased
in the U.S. since the 1960s, in Japan since the 1970s, and in the UK and Germany since the
1980s. Further, levels of employment relative to the working age population are at or above 70%
in Japan, Sweden, the UK and the U.S., but substantially lower in France and Italy.
Early retirement options have helped to lower employment relative to the working age
population. Early retirement exists in all countries – except the UK. In addition to formal early
retirement options, some countries use unemployment insurance provisions to offer what are de
factor early retirement benefits for elderly unemployed workers (France, Germany). In some
cases, disability benefits also serve partially as early retirement benefits (France, Germany, UK).
All in all, the share of retirees who have retired under some form of early retirement option often
exceeds 50% of all retirees, thereby lowering the median retirement age and the labor force
participation rates of workers close to the normal retirement age.
Lower productivity and wage growth may have also played a role everywhere. In all
countries, benefits are related to past earnings, which means that funding constraints arise as
income is growing slower than benefits. In contrast, in France, Sweden, the UK and the US
future benefits are indexed to inflation. Thus, faster real wage growth can help to ease funding
constraints as benefits growth is slower than wage growth. Finally, Germany’s and Japan’s
benefits are indexed to after-tax wage growth, which means that slower wage growth has little
impact on public pension finances.
Further, increasing income inequality may have impacted all systems. In France,
Germany, and the U.S., there are income ceilings for covered wages. Greater income inequality
can result in a declining share of national income being covered, thereby lowering the income to
public pension systems. Further, all systems have some redistributive aspects, such as minimum
pensions, non-earnings related, flat benefits, or explicit redistributive factors in the benefit
formula, which means that benefits relative to covered income rising for the relevant income
groups. The impact of greater income inequality is larger, though, where the income ceiling is21
lower, or where redistribution is greater: more aggregate income will reach the non-taxable
threshold sooner, or more low life-time earners require larger benefits relative to their earnings.
Funding constraints for public pension systems may not only result from demographic
and economic changes, but also from policy choices that make the systems more generous. Aside
from frequent tax rate changes (table 2), the seven OECD countries have made infrequent
changes to benefits. Out of a total of 40 changes in all seven countries over the course of 28
years, 22 have meant benefit increases, 14 have meant benefit cuts, and 4 have had ambiguous
benefit effects. The vast majority of benefit increases, 20, have been before the 1990’s, whereas
the majority of benefit cuts, 10, have been in the 1990’s (table 12). Thus, while public pensions
became more generous before the 1990’s, the likelihood of benefit cuts increased in the 1990’s.
Private Pensions as a Solution?
Privatization has been proposed as a means to reduce the financing needs of public
pensions. Privatization refers to the investment of public pension assets in private market
securities, which can be invested by individuals or the government (or the respective public
pension agencies). Since the focus is on investments in private securities, privatization is slightly
different from partial or full pre-funding. Pre-funded public pension systems hold assets,
including public securities, such as government debt, to cover part or all of their future liabilities.
Rates of Return and Cost Comparisons
Privatization proponents argue that individual accounts will generate higher rates of
return, thus reducing financing needs without reducing benefits.
Public pensions promise relatively high rates of return for some workers, especially for
low life-time earners. Most public pensions offer benefits that are also available in the private
market, but often at higher costs. In particular, public pensions offer indexed lifetime annuities,
disability and life insurance. In an analysis of the U.S. system’s implicit rates of return, Baker
(1998) estimates that the real rate of return for a couple with one low wage earner is 5.0%, and
for a couple with two low wage earners is 3.5% if the insurance value of Social Security is
accounted for. In comparison, realistic rates of return for private equity accounts should be
around 4% given the long-term projections made by the U.S. public pension trustees (Baker,
1997), or around 4-4.5% given the current market overvaluation (Diamond, 1999).
The two factors that underlie the projections of lower real rates of return in the U.S. in the
future are slower economic growth, and thus also slower profit growth, and the serious
overvaluation of the stock market. Both of these trends also hold for the other six countries. Real
GDP growth was slower during the 1990s than during the 1970s, and – with the exception of
Germany – slower than during the 1980s (table 14).
* Insert table 14 here *
In contrast to the real economy, where real and productivity growth have been sluggish,
equity markets have increased rapidly, particularly during the 1990s. Price earnings ratios almost
doubled in the UK and in the U.S., increased two-and-a-half-fold in Sweden, and almost tripled
in Germany between 1990 and 1998. Italy’s and Japan’s price earnings ratios have fallen
precipitously from their heights in the early 1990s, but they still remain significantly higher in
the late 1990s than during the early 1990s. Also, dividend yields have fallen everywhere over the
course of the 1990s, with the exception of Sweden, despite the fact that in all countries but Japan
capital share of business sector income has increased between 1990 and 1998 (OECD, 1998a).22
The combination of slower economic growth and slower productivity growth with recent
rapid growth in stock market valuations increases the chance that future equity rates of return
will fall below their past averages. Both lower expected profit growth and overvalued stock
markets should result in lower rates of return in the medium to long-term
13.
In comparison, internal rates of return for public pension systems can be largely expected
to remain stable. For the U.S., the internal rate of return for Social Security has been estimated to
be 3.5% for a couple with two low wage earners (Baker, 1998). Rates of return for other public
pension systems may be slightly lower than for the U.S. because of fewer economies of scale
(Mitchell, 1996). In particular, higher administrative costs elsewhere suggest fewer economies of
scale. By and large, administrative costs increase with the size of the funds to be administered or
with the number of people to be serviced (Mitchell, 1996)
14.
Even though administrative costs for public pension systems appear to differ strongly
across countries, they are small compared to the costs that privatized accounts cost. Fund
management alone costs between 1% and 2% of assets annually in the U.S.. Over a 30-year
investment horizon, as administrative costs accumulate, total final savings are more than 20%
less than they would have been absent of administrative costs. Orszag (1999) and Murthi et al.
(1999) estimate that total administrative costs lower the accumulated savings by 25% over a
worker’s working life in the UK. In addition, costs that arise from switching between funds are
estimated to amount to 15% of total accumulated savings at the end of a worker’s working life.
Privatization of public pensions also requires additional costs that are often ignored.
Private pensions require that workers use financial management companies to manage their
funds while they work. Once a worker retires, an insurance company needs to provide retirement
benefits in the form of lifetime annuities
15. Mitchell et al. (1997) estimate that annuities cost on
average 15-20% of annual premiums in the U.S.. Given current life expectancies at age 65, this
translates into 4-6% of the total accumulated savings at the end of one’s working life. For the
UK, Orszag (1999) and Murthi et al. (1999) estimate annuity costs to be 10% of the account
value at retirement. Considering that both the U.S. and the UK have well developed financial
market that are more likely to benefit from economies of scale than financial institutions in other
countries, costs in less developed financial markets can be expected to be at least as high.
Finally, privatization requires transition costs. Workers have already incurred benefit
claims against the existing public pension system. To honor these claims, public pension systems
require funds even after privatization has ended their revenue stream. In a model calculation for
the U.S., the Employee Benefit Research Institute (Olsen et al., 1998) estimated that transition
costs under a fully privatized system would amount to 5% over 40 years.
The Risks of Private Accounts
The combination of lower expected rates of returns than in the past, and of higher costs
than public pensions reduces the presumed competitive advantage that private accounts would
have. However, even though the higher rates of return that are supposedly associated with private
accounts are unlikely to materialize, the higher risks that workers would incur by investing in
private accounts remain undiminished. Aside from the obvious financial market risk, workers
have to face additional economic, regulatory and political risks.
Private pensions subject workers to more risks than public pensions, such as the risks of
bad investment decisions, fraud, or bankruptcy of plan sponsors. While private pensions may be
able to match the expected retirement income on average, the variations of retirement income
become larger, exposing workers automatically to greater retirement income insecurity. A
reliance on private pensions as replacement of public pensions weakens their insurance value.23
Private pensions can be defined benefit or defined contribution plans. In defined benefit
plans, workers face the risk that the plan sponsor goes bankrupt. Employer bankruptcy poses less
of a problem in defined contribution plans, but workers bear financial market risks alone. Most
private pensions in the seven countries are defined benefits plans (table 15). This is changing in
the UK and the U.S., where private pension coverage is most widespread.
* Insert table 15 here *
Second, workers cannot rely on private pensions in the same way as they can on public
pensions. If permitted by law, employers can change benefit promises e.g, under US law,
employers cannot reduce already accrued benefits, but they can change future benefit accruals.
Third, long vesting periods or restricted portability of pensions reduce the value of
private pensions if workers change jobs. How long it takes for workers to become vested
depends on the law, on the plan type and on the employer. Should the worker, leave before she is
vested in a plan, no retirement benefits are accrued. Maximum vesting periods range from an
immediate vesting in Sweden to 30 years in Japan (table 15). If portability of pensions is
restricted, workers may keep the benefits, but costs and risks cannot be consolidated. Portability
is restricted to some degree in all countries, except Sweden (table 15).
Fourth, accumulated pension wealth may be used for purposes other than retirement
income. The permission to “cash out” account balances requires that workers correctly assess
their financial needs over an indeterminate time horizon. Similarly, if pension benefits are not
indexed price increases can erode the value of private pensions over time. Indexation is only
mandatory in Germany, but it is possible in Sweden, the UK and the US (table 15).
Fifth, regulations may protect workers from investment risks. The permission for
individual investors or pension plans to invest in riskier, but potentially higher yielding securities
raises the risk of losses. In defined benefit plans some risks can be mitigated through
diversification, but market risks remain. Most countries impose limits on the asset allocation of
pension plans (table 16). The restrictions are loosest in the US, and strictest in Sweden.
* Insert table 16 here *
Also, large-scale privatizations would overwhelm domestic financial markets and local
regulators in most countries since private pensions are only a small part of financial market
activities. Table 17 shows that in three countries, France, Germany and Italy, private pension
accounts amount to less than 6% of GDP. Further, in all three countries, market capitalizations
are significantly lower than in three countries, Sweden, the UK and the U.S., where private
pensions are more widespread (table 18). Privatizations would mean the rapid creation of private
pension funds. For instance, the German government has proposed to create individual accounts
to which workers would contribute 2.5% of payroll in order to replace part of the benefits cut in
the 1999 reform of the German public pension system. Given the size of the German public
pension system and assuming that the vast majority, say 80%, of private pension funds are
invested in equities, German pension funds would increase demand for equities by 2.0% of GDP
annually. This additional demand reflects currently more than 4% of Germany’s market
capitalization, and this demand would continue each year indefinitely. Considering that equity
markets are already overvalued, additional demand of this magnitude would help to extend a24
stock market bubble, and workers could face an increasing risk of a market downturn with their
retirement assets.
* Insert table 17 here *
* Insert table 18 here *
The risks and costs associated with private pensions only apply to those, who actually
have private pensions. However, as the example of the two countries with the largest private
pension systems, the UK and the U.S., indicates the distribution of those benefits is quite
unequal. In the UK, 65% of full-time workers who earned between 64 pounds and 100 pounds
per week had neither an occupational nor a personal pension plan, leaving them with their
supplementary SERPS benefits that are cut from 25% of wages to 20% of wages (CBO, 1999).
Similarly, while 79% of full-time workers at medium and large U.S. firm were covered by some
form of a private pension plan in 1997, less than half of all full-time workers at small firms were
covered by any plan in 1996. Finally, Disney et al. (1998) report that families reporting financial
wealth, where the household head is 67 years old, range from 80% for bottom quintile to 98% for
the top quintile n Germany. Further, the dispersion ranges from 84% to 97% in Sweden, from
50% to 80% in the UK, and from 54 to 97% in the US (Disney et al., 1998).
The fact that private pensions carry a larger risk with them than public pensions has put
workers into a bind. Also, public pension benefits are reduced in a number of countries (table
13), and there seems to be a shift from defined benefits to defined contribution plans, especially
in countries, where private pensions are an important source of retirement income. Workers are
therefore faced with the option of lower risks and subsequently less retirement income or the
possibility of higher retirement income at a significantly higher risk. Consequently, workers tend
to invest their retirement savings increasingly in risky equity funds. About 75% of all 401(k)
plan balances in the U.S. were estimated to be invested directly or indirectly in equities
(VanDerhei et al., 2000). More specifically, plan holders in their 60s still have 39.2% invested in
equities, whereas people in their 20s have 62.2% directly invested in equities. Similarly, in the
UK case 80% of pension fund assets were invested in equity in 1994 (EC, 1997).
The promised rates of return for private accounts, particularly private equity accounts are
unlikely to materialize in the medium to long-term because of slower expected GDP and
productivity growth, and because of the current market valuations. In addition, the costs
associated with private pensions are substantially higher than the costs associated with public
pensions for the same services. Further, private pensions shift risks from the public to the
individual. The risks for the individual seem to have especially increased in countries where the
reliance on private pensions is most pronounced, the U.S. and the UK.
Concluding Remarks
Public pensions have been a successful tool in combating poverty among the elderly. The
commitment to the elderly to provide them with adequate retirement income seems to be intact in
the industrialized countries. However, the question is whether governments should continue to
provide public pensions as social insurances, or whether private markets should take over. The
evidence presented in this paper suggests that public pension can be provided as public goods in
the foreseeable future if policy changes are made, and that private pensions would put the social
insurance aspect of public pensions in jeopardy.25
Financial needs of public pensions appear to have grown. Higher tax rates and benefit
cuts have been the result. The evidence suggests that both economic factors as well as the
particular design of each country’s public pension system have led to greater financing needs.
Especially slow employment and wage growth and possibly rising income inequality have
adversely impacted the finances of all public pension systems.
Projections of future problems rest to a large degree on rather pessimistic assumptions
about economic trends, and the unchanged structure of public pensions. Under more moderate
assumptions the burden of caring for the elderly for workers grows slower or declines. Finally,
regardless of the underlying assumptions, the living standards of future generations are likely to
be substantially higher than those of current workers.
The changing demographics that exist in each country and that are likely to continue can
be compensated by more rapid employment growth and more rapid productivity and wage
growth than is currently expected. Thus, policymakers have the opportunity to influence forces
that can compensate for the continued increase in longevity and the decline in population growth.
The goal of policies that will ensure the future of public pensions should be to raise
employment and productivity. In particular, labor force participation could be boosted through
family friendly policies that allow parents to combine child rearing responsibilities and full-time
jobs. Even though raising the normal retirement age could increase labor force participation,
such a benefit is very regressive and puts the largest burden on low lifetime earners, and thus
should not be further pursued. Macro economic policies could be used, particularly in Europe, as
a stimulus to lower unemployment and raise employment growth. In particular, a less stringent
monetary policy appears to be a means to achieve lower unemployment. Finally, more equal
earnings distributions can be achieved through government policies, such the setting of a
minimum wage, or through the strengthening of collective bargaining.
Aside from economic policies, changes in the structure of public pensions may be
necessary to ensure their long-term viability. In particular, public pensions should be universal
systems that require everybody to participate. Second, public pensions should not serve as a
substitute for unemployment insurance. Third, the financing base of public pensions should be
stable. Thus, shifts in labor income as share of national income should not affect public pension
finances. In particular, instead of financing public pensions solely out of payroll taxes, other
forms of income, such as capital income, could also be taxed. Similarly, public pensions could be
financed out of general revenue.
Privatization of pensions, albeit increasingly popular, appears too risky and too costly to
be viable. Also, in many cases, they constitute only a small addition to public pensions, with the
exceptions of the UK and the US. While coverage of workers under private pension schemes
seems to increase in countries where such plans are rather small, it is declining in the two
countries where pension coverage is relatively large. Further, a rapid privatization of a
significant share of public pensions, that would be necessary to make it a viable option in theory,
would most likely overwhelm private financial institutions and markets, possibly leading to
financial instability and greater risks for workers.
It is time to put the debate over the future of public pensions in a serious framework.
Thus, the pessimistic “gloom and doom” forecasts of those who want to see an end to
government administered and publicly supported social insurance have to be put in perspective.
Where the underlying public pension structures are adversely affected, possibly even to a degree
that magnifies existing trends the solutions lie both in redesigning public pensions and in
affecting inequality, productivity and employment growth in a positive manner. There is no law26
of nature that says that industrialized economies will be mired in slow growth, and rising
inequality in the long-term future. Policy makers have the option to affect the economic
outcomes in a positive manner that would aid their public pension systems directly.27
Appendix:
Calculating Combined Tax Rates for OECD Countries
This section describes how the calculation for the combined tax rates in table 2.
France
Government contributions are reported as share of benefit payments in 1969, and as share
of income between 1989 and 1997. The reported figures for 1999 (“various subsidies”) are
assumed to be close to zero, and are hence ignored. It is assumed that income and outgo are
identical. Thus, the combined employer and employee contributions out of average earnings are
scaled by the share made up by government contributions.
Germany
Government contributions are reported as share of benefit payments (1961-1969), and as
share of total system (1971-1999). It is assumed that both benefits and contributions are identical
and that there are no other costs. Hence, the combined employer and employee contribution rates
are scaled by the government contribution to arrive at the combined tax rate.
Italy
For 1997, employer contributions amount to 8.89% for earnings up to lire 63,054,000 per
year and to 9.9% for earnings above that, but below 250,000,000. For 1997 and 1999, employee
contributions are two-tiered. Since the first tier is very close to the annual average wage rate of
the business sector, only the first tier tax rate is used for either employer or employee.
Government contributions are reported as share of total covered earnings (1961-1964), as
share of costs (1967), or as lump-sum subsidies (1969-1999). For the years 1961 and 1964, the
government’s percentage contribution is added to employer and employee contribution rates, and
for 1967, the combined employer and employee contribution rates are scaled by the
government’s contribution to arrive at the combined tax rates. In all other year, the government’s
contribution is set equal to zero.
Japan
Employee contributions are reported as fixed yen amount. I divide them by average
annual wage rate of the business sector to arrive at the average tax rate. Complete data are only
available from 1980 forward. Between 1980 and 1993, three tax rates (women, men, miners) are
averaged (simple average), and between 1995 and 1999, two tax rates (women, men) are
averaged for the welfare pensions. Finally, the tax rates for welfare pensions and for national
pensions are added.
Both welfare and national pensions receive government contributions as share of benefits.
It is assumed that benefits are equal to contributions and that there are no other substantial costs.
Hence, the combined employer and employee contributions are scaled – separately for each
program - by the government contributions.
Sweden
Employer contributions are reported as share of payroll since 1975 for universal pensions
and since 1983 for supplementary pensions. Before 1975, there are no employer contributions to
universal pensions, and before 1983, employer contributions to supplementary pensions are
reported as share of earnings between a lower and an upper bound. Tax rates that fall below
between an upper and a lower bound are scaled by the difference between upper and lower
bound relative to the upper bound, which lies well beyond the average wage rate.
Government contributions to universal pensions are reported as share of benefits and
other costs. It is assumed that benefit payments are equal to contributions. Combined employer
and employee contributions to universal pensions are scaled by government contributions.28
United Kingdom
Where ranges of tax rates are reported, the simple average is taken. If tax is only payable
above a weekly earnings threshold (as is the case in 1999), the tax rates are scaled by average
wage rates above the earnings threshold relative to average earnings.
Government contributions are reported as share of benefits and other costs between 1975
and as “various subsidies” after that. Hence, combined employer and employee contributions are
scaled by government contributions between 1975 and 1991. Government contributions are
assumed to be marginal thereafter, and hence set equal to zero.
United States
The average wage is below the income tax above which income is not subject to the
payroll tax. Thus, the combined tax rate is simply the sum of employer and employee
contribution rates.29
The Ability to Pay and Changes in Living Standards
A country’s ability to pay for its retirees depends on the number of workers relative to all
retirees and on average wages and benefits. I first construct a measure that adjusts each year’s
ratio of beneficiaries to workers by increases in before tax real wages, and by changes in benefit
indexation, where necessary. I call this adjusted ratio the Care for the Aged and Retired by
Employees Ratio (CARER).
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with POP65+ as the sum of all people above the age of 64, EMPLOYEES as total employment,
wt-n, t as the average wage growth for the past n years (equal to the maximum of years needed for
full benefits), which is scaled by the proportion of 65-year-olds relative to all elderly, newret. .
The number of employees is scaled by the real before tax wages relative to their level in 2000,
the base year. All economic variables are real, thus in countries where benefits are indexed to
inflation, the benefits indexation, BenIndex, is equal to one. In countries, where benefits are
indexed to either net wages (Germany, Japan), BenIndex is equal to the after tax wage or real
GDP in period t-1 (indexed to after tax wages or GDP in 2000).
A few assumptions are necessary for this calculation. The number of public pension
beneficiaries is equal to the number of over 65-year-olds. Since all public pension systems offer
not only retirement, but also disability and survivorship benefits, and in some cases welfare or
poverty pensions (see section II for a detailed description of each country’s benefits), the vast
majority of over 64-year-olds will receive benefits in one form or another.
To calculate changes in the net wage relative to its level in 2000, I proceed as follows.
The change in the after tax wage is equal to the change in the before tax wage minus changes in
tax rates. I assume that taxes other than public pension taxes remain constant over time. As a
country’s population ages, this assumption is likely to overstate the tax burden on workers
because an aging population will most likely incur fewer costs for child care, education and other
expenses related to the younger share of the population. Further, changes in public pension taxes
are arrived at by multiplying the cumulative percentage changes of the CARERatio with each
country’s combined tax rate in 1999 (see table 2 for details).
Different sources are used for the calculations. Demographic variables are provided by
the U.S. Bureau of the Census’ International Data Base. All economic variables, with the
exception of the CPI, are taken from the OECD’s Economic Outlook Database, and the CPI is
taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM.30
TABLE 1
OLD AGE CASH BENEFITS AS SHARE OF GDP
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
1980 7.79 9.99 7.36 3.50 6.83 5.07 5.05
1985 8.81 10.11 9.04 4.29 7.35 5.57 5.21
1990 9.32 9.52 9.63 4.42 7.50 6.37 5.05
1995 10.36 10.29 10.99 5.49 8.17 6.46 5.36
Notes: All figures are in percent. Old age cash benefits include old-age pensions, old-age civil
servant pensions, veteran’s old-age pensions, early retirement pensions and other old-age cash
benefits. Source is OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX).31
TABLE 2
COMBINED TAX RATES AS SHARE OF AVERAGE WAGE, 1961 TO 1999
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK U.S.
1961 19.50 19.05 21.10 N/A 17.67 N/A 6.00
1971 8.75 20.00 19.00 N/A 25.55 N/A 9.20
1981 13.00 21.51 24.31 13.74 22.62 26.16 10.70
1991 15.02 20.73 26.28 15.32 22.85 13.92 12.40
1999 16.45 24.38 32.70 18.72 19.56 17.41 12.40
Average annual rate of change
1961-1999 -0.08 0.14 0.31 N/A 0.05 N/A 0.17
1961-1969 -1.28 0.34 -0.75 N/A 0.74 N/A 0.14
1969-1979 0.43 0.14 0.46 N/A -0.08 2.45 0.10
1979-1989 0.29 0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.00 -1.07 0.14
1989-1999 0.14 0.36 0.64 0.34 -0.33 0.35 0.00
Notes: All figures are in percent. All combined tax rates are based on author’s own calculations based on SSA,
Social Security Programs throughout the World. See the appendix for assumptions made in calculations.32
TABLE 3
65 YEAR OLDS AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION, 1990 TO 2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
1990 14.02 - - 11.96 17.79 - 12.50
2000 16.00 16.25 18.09 17.01 17.29 15.67 12.64
2010 16.79 19.70 20.55 21.76 19.18 16.69 13.23
2020 20.61 21.41 23.55 26.83 22.69 19.59 16.52
2030 23.98 25.75 28.15 28.31 25.08 23.50 20.02
2040 26.45 28.43 34.24 31.85 27.11 26.35 20.44
2050 27.25 28.55 36.10 33.86 27.23 26.83 20.30
Notes: All figures are in percent. Source is the U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database.33
TABLE 4
POPULATION GROWTH, FERTILITY RATES AND LIFE EXPECTANCY FOR FIVE EU COUNTRIES
Population Growth Fertility Rate Life Expectancy
1970-75 1980-85 1992-97 1970-75 1980-85 1992-97 1970-75 1980-85 1992-97
France 0.4 0.5 0.4 1.9 1.8 1.7 72 75 78
Germany 0.2 -0.2 0.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 71 73 77
Italy 0.6 0.1 0.2 2.2 1.4 1.2 72 75 78
Sweden 0.4 0.1 0.3 1.8 1.7 1.7 75 76 79
UK 0.2 0.1 0.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 72 74 77
Japan 1.4 0.7 0.2 1.9 1.8 1.4 74 78 80
US 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.8 1.8 2.0 73 75 76
Notes: Population growth and fertility rates are in percent, life expectancy is in years. Source is the World Bank,
Poverty Monitoring Database.34
TABLE 5
EMPLOYMENT AS SHARE OF TOTAL POPULATION AND AS SHARE OF POPULATION BETWEEN 15 AND 64,
1960 TO 2000
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
Average employment as share of total population Average employment as share of working age population (15 to 64 years)
1960-1999 40.07 44.22 36.50 48.83 48.61 45.05 42.43 62.52 66.21 55.33 71.62 75.12 70.00 66.10
1960-1973 41.02 44.74 37.30 48.34 47.74 45.68 37.43 65.85 68.99 57.86 71.26 72.52 71.59 61.38
1973-1979 40.96 42.56 35.91 46.96 49.61 44.66 41.65 65.14 65.85 55.98 69.53 77.44 70.83 64.00
1979-1999 39.38 44.26 35.95 49.79 48.90 44.63 46.21 60.24 64.36 53.12 72.40 76.22 68.57 70.06
Notes: All figures are in percent. Sources are the OECD, Economic Outlook, various years, and the U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Data Base.35
TABLE 6
PRODUCTIVITY AND WAGE GROWTH RATES, 1960-1999





1960 – 1999 2.36 2.31 2.99 3.92 2.16 2.13 1.54
1960 – 1973 2.24 7.67 3.97 4.25 5.37 3.08 3.48
1973 – 1979 0.29 2.73 2.65 2.35 2.34 1.24 0.53
1979 – 1999 1.36 1.88 1.01 1.64 1.62 1.74 1.81
Wage rate growth (in business sector)
1960 – 1999 1.42 2.20 2.82 2.32 1.70 1.86 0.53
1960 – 1973 N/A 5.11 6.11 8.08 N/A 3.58 1.48
1973 – 1979 2.73 2.25 4.26 1.65 N/A 0.99 -1.13
1979 – 1999 0.61 0.40 0.38 0.50 1.79 1.87 0.43
Notes: All figures are in percent. Source is the OECD, Economic Outlook Database. Hourly earnings for Germany
are from 1963, for UK from 1964, for Italy and France from 1969, and for Sweden from 1971. Wage rates are
available for Japan only from 1966, for France from 1970, for the UK from 1969 and for Sweden from 1980.36
TABLE 7
BURDEN OF CARING FOR THE ELDERLY FOR CURRENT WORKERS
(CARER), SHORT RANGE ASSUMPTIONS, 2000 TO 2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
Productivity
Growth
1.36 1.88 1.01 1.64 1.62 1.74 1.81
D (Employment/P
opulation)
-0.22 -0.10 -0.19 0.22 -0.35 -0.01 0.38
CARER
2000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2010 90.05 108.89 102.07 118.75 91.30 91.13 83.61
2020 90.05 114.34 100.84 132.64 86.15 87.19 74.94
2030 89.42 128.05 102.21 134.67 74.29 84.61 68.28
2040 86.68 137.11 106.94 135.23 62.46 75.35 57.71
2050 79.90 139.71 92.09 125.25 47.94 60.51 48.17
After-tax wage
2000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2010 116.18 117.95 109.72 113.89 119.41 120.54 121.86
2020 133.14 140.52 121.76 130.48 141.33 144.19 147.49
2030 152.54 164.17 134.56 152.86 169.80 172.12 177.84
2040 175.23 192.73 146.12 179.59 203.87 207.43 215.47
2050 202.78 230.93 168.42 214.71 246.24 252.87 260.90
Notes: See Appendix for methodology, assumptions and sources. An increase in CARER indicates a growing burden
for workers, a decline in the index indicates a shrinking burden for workers. Both CARER and net wages are
indexed to 2000 as the base year.37
TABLE 8
BURDEN OF CARING FOR THE ELDERLY FOR CURRENT WORKERS
(CARER), LONG-RANGE ASSUMPTIONS, 2000 TO 2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
Productivity
Growth (%)
2.36 2.31 2.99 3.92 2.16 2.13 1.54
D (Employment/P
opulation) (%)
-0.15 -0.13 -0.26 0.03 -0.03 -0.05 0.34
CARER
2000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2010 81.39 108.94 84.35 119.89 86.10 87.93 85.96
2020 73.61 114.72 67.37 136.69 77.69 81.25 79.06
2030 66.06 128.98 51.44 133.39 64.33 75.99 73.88
2040 57.78 138.66 35.94 116.83 52.47 64.50 64.10
2050 48.01 141.83 18.43 89.13 39.14 48.76 54.94
After-tax wage
2000 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2010 129.78 123.02 140.22 142.09 127.05 125.85 118.36
2020 166.13 152.77 198.66 202.13 159.61 157.16 139.17
2030 212.35 185.95 281.04 297.89 202.76 195.79 163.14
2040 271.60 227.37 395.81 449.87 256.81 246.14 192.29
2050 348.44 283.78 562.23 693.59 326.30 312.26 226.62
Notes: See Appendix for methodology, assumptions and sources. An increase in CARER indicates a growing burden
for workers, a decline in the index indicates a shrinking burden for workers. Both CARER and net wages are
indexed to 2000 as the base year.38
TABLE 9
COMPARISON OF “CARER” AND AFTER TAX WAGES BASED ON SHORT-RANGE OR
LONG-RANGE ASSUMPTIONS, 2000 TO 2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
CARER
2010 -9.6 0.1 -17.4 1.0 -5.7 -3.5 2.8
2020 -18.3 0.3 -33.2 3.1 -9.8 -6.8 5.5
2030 -26.1 0.7 -49.7 -0.9 -13.4 -10.2 8.2
2040 -33.3 1.1 -66.4 -13.6 -16.0 -14.4 11.1
2050 -39.9 1.5 -80.0 -28.8 -18.4 -19.4 14.1
After-tax wage
2010 11.7 4.3 15.5 24.8 6.4 4.4 -2.9
2020 24.8 8.7 30.3 54.9 12.9 9.0 -5.6
2030 39.2 13.3 49.6 94.9 19.4 13.8 -8.3
2040 55.0 18.0 79.8 150.5 26.0 18.7 -10.8
2050 71.8 22.9 135.0 223.0 32.5 23.5 -13.1
Notes: All figures are in percent. The difference measures the results based on the long-range assumptions minus the
results based on the short-range results. See Appendix for methodology, assumptions and sources. An increase in
CARERatio indicates a growing burden for workers, a decline in the index indicates a shrinking burden for workers.
Both CARERatio and net wages are indexed to 2000 as the base year.39
TABLE 10
PCHANGES OF “CARER” UNDER DIFFERENT ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS, 2000 TO
2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
Faster productivity growth
2010 -5.6 -0.1 -5.6 0.1 -5.3 -5.4 -5.7
2020 -10.8 0.0 -11.0 0.6 -10.5 -10.1 -11.1
2030 -15.6 0.2 -17.2 -0.2 -16.4 -14.6 -16.1
2040 -20.2 0.4 -24.8 -3.5 -21.8 -19.8 -20.8
2050 -24.6 0.6 -33.5 -8.1 -27.9 -25.8 -25.3
Higher employment growth
2010 -2.3 -1.7 -0.3 -1.0 -1.1 -0.5 -1.2
2020 -5.2 -3.7 1.4 -0.5 0.2 0.5 -2.7
2030 -8.2 -6.1 3.4 0.7 3.3 3.9 -3.2
2040 -11.1 -8.3 6.2 2.1 6.1 8.0 -3.2
2050 -12.9 -9.0 11.2 3.0 8.3 11.4 -3.2
Faster productivity growth and higher employment growth
2010 -7.8 -1.8 -5.8 -0.8 -6.3 -5.8 -6.9
2020 -15.4 -3.7 -9.0 0.5 -9.7 -9.2 -13.4
2030 -22.6 -5.9 -12.1 1.4 -12.0 -9.7 -18.7
2040 -29.1 -7.9 -15.2 0.1 -14.5 -10.5 -23.4
2050 -34.3 -8.2 -18.4 -3.4 -18.8 -13.4 -27.7
Notes: All figures are in percent. Baseline assumptions are 1.4% productivity growth and 0% employment growth
relative to working age population. Alternative assumptions are 2% productivity growth and 0.4% annual change in
employment relative to working age population up to a maximum of 80%. See Appendix for methodology,
assumptions and sources. An increase in CARER indicates a growing burden for workers, a decline in the index
indicates a shrinking burden for workers. Both CARER and net wages are indexed to 2000 as the base year.40
TABLE 11
CHANGES OF “CARER” UNDER DIFFERENT POLICY ASSUMPTIONS, 2000 TO 2050
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK US
Changed indexation and CARER (% change from baseline)
2010 14.7 -11.2 11.8 -9.0 14.1 13.7 13.4
2020 29.7 -22.0 24.7 -18.5 28.4 28.1 27.3
2030 46.6 -30.2 38.7 -28.8 46.5 43.7 44.0
2040 66.1 -37.9 52.2 -38.1 67.4 62.9 65.1
2050 90.0 -45.8 76.3 -46.8 93.9 88.4 89.8
Lower retirement age and CARER (% change from baseline)
2010 9.3 5.9 11.3 7.6 8.2 7.5 4.1
2020 20.3 16.1 26.3 11.7 15.9 16.1 10.5
2030 27.4 23.6 47.9 18.1 23.4 25.0 11.3
2040 25.1 17.4 44.0 19.6 20.0 19.7 10.0
2050 26.9 20.7 37.7 16.4 24.2 23.3 11.0
Changed indexation and after tax wages (index levels)
2010 114.7 115.6 111.77 113.1 114.1 113.7 115.0
2020 129.7 135.7 124.73 129.7 128.4 128.1 131.2
2030 146.6 156.4 138.66 152.7 146.5 143.7 149.2
2040 166.1 181.3 152.22 179.5 167.4 162.9 171.1
2050 190.0 213.5 176.35 212.4 193.9 188.4 196.7
Lower retirement age and after tax wages (index levels)
2010 115.6 111.1 111.89 109.6 115.2 114.8 116.0
2020 131.4 123.2 125.01 120.9 131.1 130.5 133.4
2030 150.1 133.2 136.36 136.4 151.4 147.6 153.7
2040 174.7 152.4 158.13 155.6 178.4 173.2 179.2
2050 203.7 172.8 200.29 183.4 210.2 203.9 208.3
Notes: Productivity growth is assumed to be 1.4% per year, and employment growth is assumed to be 0.4% annually
relative to working age population. Baseline indexation is actual indexation (see table 12). Indexation is
subsequently changed from net wages and GDP to prices for Germany, Italy and Japan, and from prices to after tax
wage growth for all other countries. The assumed retirement age is lowered from 65 to 60 in a linear progression at a
rate of 0.2 years per year. See Appendix for methodology, assumptions and sources. An increase in CARER
indicates a growing burden for workers, a decline in the index indicates a shrinking burden for workers. Both
CARER and net wages are indexed to 2000 as the base year.41
TABLE 12















Years of required coverage extended to 34 from 30.
Pre-retirement benefit for unemployment.
Increase in replacement ratio beginning in 1975
Voluntary affiliation for nonworking homemakers












Years of required coverage extended to 40 starting in 2003.
Benefit calculation based on best 25 years in 2008, up from best






Introduction of early retirement benefits.






Indexation shifted from gross wage to net wage growth






Benefits indexed to inflation for two years (2000 and 2001) and to
net wages thereafter.
Contributions for the unemployed based on unemployment
benefits and not on last income.
Italy











Funding switched to PAYG
Benefit computation based on “final salary”
Introduction of means-tested minimum pension
Inflation indexation of benefits
Introduction of early retirement benefits.
1976 IB Benefit increase Real wage growth indexation
1982 NRA Benefit increase Lowering age for preretirement benefits to 55 (men) and 50
(women), respectively.





As of 1993, NRA raised to 60 (men) and 55 (women),
respectively.
Beginning in 1994, the NRA will rise by 1 year every 2 years to
age 65 (men) and 60 (women).
















Pensions based on lifetime income.
Benefits from PAYG system indexed to real income growth.
Benefits from PAYG system adjusted for life expectancy.
Guaranteed minimum pension.
Japan
1973 IB Benefit increase Inflation indexation of benefits for both programs
1994 ￿ Benefit cut
~
Target replacement ratio reduced to 30% of monthly wages –
down from 60% - , to be reached by 2025.
Benefit indexation changed to net wage growth from inflation
UK
1966 wBt Benefit increase Means-tested allowance introduced
1971 wBt Benefit increase Old person’s pension for retirees age 80 and above introduced
1978 wBt Benefit increase Introduction of earnings related pension (SERPS)
US
1973 IB Benefit increase Inflation indexation of benefits introduced
1983 NB Benefit increase
Benefit cut
Federal employees hired after December 31, 1983 are included
NRA gradually increased for workers who attain age 62 in 2000
and thereafter such that NRA is equal to 67 in 2022 and after.
Notes: Only changes to old age retirement benefits are included.
Source: Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World,
various years.43
TABLE 13
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS
Funded Earned
Benefit














France Partial Yes 50% of best 11 to 25 years
(depending on year of
birth)
Prices Yes - - -
Germany PAYG Yes 70% of net average wages
in economy
Net wages Yes - - -
Italy PAYG Yes 80% of average lifetime
earnings




No 96% of basic amount (BA)





No - - -
UK Partial Yes 16% of average male
earnings (basic) plus 25%
of average lifetime
earnings (supplement)
Prices No - - -
Japan Partial Yes Target of 30% of monthly
wages in 2025
Net wages No - - -
US Partial Yes 39.6% of average earnings
in economy
Prices Yes - - -
Source: Social Security Administration, Social Security Programs Throughout the World, various years.44
TABLE 14
REAL GDP GROWTH
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK U.S.
1990 2.52 5.74 1.97 5.08 1.36 0.64 1.23
1991 0.78 5.01 1.39 3.8 -1.12 -1.49 -0.93
1992 1.16 2.24 0.76 1.02 -1.42 0.05 2.71
1993 -1.33 -1.09 -0.88 0.31 -2.22 2.32 2.32
1994 2.83 2.35 2.21 0.64 3.94 4.39 3.46
1995 2.08 1.75 2.92 1.47 3.71 2.79 2.28
1996 1.55 0.75 0.87 5.05 1.28 2.56 3.45
1997 2.32 1.75 1.48 1.43 1.79 3.51 3.93
1998 3.2 2.25 1.34 -2.83 2.63 2.24 3.88
1999 2.47 1.42 1.23 1.04 3.19 1.14 3.71
Averages
1970 to 1979 3.73 3.15 3.91 5.21 1.79 2.40 3.19
1989 to 1989 2.27 1.79 2.40 3.78 2.72 2.43 2.76
1990 to 1999 1.76 2.22 1.33 1.70 1.31 1.82 2.60
Notes: Source is the IMF’s, World Economic Outlook, September 2000.45
TABLE 15





Vesting Portability Coverage Min. Funding Reqmts
.
Conversion at Retirement Indexation of Benefits









10 years - 42% (W.
Germany ’92)
Yes up to PBO Payouts not in interest of
firms
Mandatory indexation




must be fully funded
based on 15-year
projections







DB Immediate Full 90%
(compulsory)











Only for opted plans Capital sum payout possible
of ¼ of the total with max.






















- No mandate Discretionary
indexation
Note: “C” indicates compulsory participation, “V” denotes voluntary participation in private pension plans; DB indicates defined
benefit plans, whereas DC denotes defined contribution plans.
Sources: OECD, Financial Market Trends, 70, June 1998; OECD, Financial Market Trends, 71, November 1998; DoL, 1999; Davis,
1994   46
TABLE 16
REGULATION GOVERNING PENSION FUND INVESTMENT
Country Portfolio Regulations
France
Germany Guidelines: 30 percent max. in EU shares, 25 percent in EU real estate, 6 percent in non-EU bonds, 20
percent in foreign assets; 10 percent self-investment.
Italy The Decree of Ministry of Finance No. 703 of 21 November 1996 on investments in pension funds
grants in general autonomy to the funds to implement their own investment strategies. There are
ceilings for investment in some categories as investment in liquid assets, admitted up to 20 percent,
shares in closed funds up to 20 percent, shares and bonds, non-quoted on regulated stock markets in
EU countries, in the U.S., in Canada or in Japan up to a ceiling of 50 percent if they are issued by
OECD member countries
Sweden The majority of investments should be made in bonds, loans, and retroverse loans to contributors
UK 5 percent max. self-investment, “prudent man rule” concentration limit for defined contribution plans
Japan 50 percent minimum in bonds, 30 percent max. in shares, 20 percent max. in real estate 30 max. in
foreign assets, and 10 percent max in the assets of a single company.
US “prudent man rule”
Source: OECD, Financial Market Trends, 71, November 199847
TABLE 17
PENSION FUND ASSETS AS SHARE OF GDP, 1987-96
1987 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996
France - 3.4 3.2 3.8 4.3 5.6
Germany 3.4 3.3 5.1 5.4 5.2 5.8
Italy - - 1.1 2.2 2.6 3.0
Sweden 33.4 31.0 29.6 25.7 30.5 32.6
United Kingdom 62.3 59.7 58.2 69.2 73.2 74.7
Japan 38.0 37.4 37.3 49.4 40.6 41.8
United States 35.7 38.1 48.2 50.6 58.9 58.2
Notes: All figures are in percent. German pension fund assets include company pension fund
assets from 1992 onwards; figures for Sweden include first pillar assets up to 1992. Source are
the OECD, Financial Market Trends, 71, November 199848
TABLE 18
MARKET CAPITALIZATIONS (AS SHARE OF GDP), PRICE EARNINGS RATIOS AND
TOTAL RATES OF RETURN FOR OECD STOCK MARKETS, 1990 TO 1998
France Germany Italy Japan Sweden UK U.S.
Market capitalization (as share of GDP)
1990 24.15 21.78 12.74 91.53 38.57 79.71 53.51
1991 28.07 20.31 12.69 85.16 37.08 89.65 68.48
1992 27.05 17.71 11.97 61.41 38.13 101.02 71.31
1993 37.18 24.64 15.87 68.38 61.39 122.67 76.93
1994 32.30 22.80 18.37 74.76 61.03 108.42 71.27
1995 31.58 23.45 18.55 75.44 67.07 122.84 93.48
1996 38.67 28.75 20.67 69.82 94.03 128.43 108.17
1997 49.37 40.28 30.78 55.09 115.05 148.99 129.27
1998 64.85 47.96 45.42 56.57 118.84 168.05 144.39
Price earnings ratios
1990 10.2 11.6 16.5 11.0 39.8 10.6 14.8
1991 13.8 14.1 16.9 22.0 37.8 14.2 25.8
1992 15.4 22 25.8 60.0 36.7 17.5 22.7
1993 19.0 24.5 58.6 31.0 64.9 24.8 23.4
1994 14.0 25.2 136.9 14.0 79.5 17.4 18.2
1995 16.0 22.3 30.2 11.0 86.5 15.6 19.2
1996 NA 20.7 18.9 17.0 79.3 15.9 20.6
1997 NA 27.8 24.7 22.0 37.6 19.2 23.9
1998 NA 30.6 25.0 21.0 103.1 23.3 27.2
Dividend yield (in percent)
1990 4.0 3.78 3.3 3.6 0.6 5.7 3.7
1991 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.2 0.7 5.0 2.4
1992 3.8 4 4.1 2.7 0.9 4.3 3.0
1993 2.7 2.9 2.5 1.4 0.8 3.9 2.5
1994 3.2 3.32 1.6 2.0 0.8 4.3 2.9
1995 3.3 2.8 1.7 2.8 0.9 3.9 2.4
1996 2.7 1.8 2.4 2.4 0.8 3.9 2.1
1997 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.0 3.2 1.7
1998 2.1 1.3 1.4 2.2 1.2 2.8 NA
Notes: Sources are the FIBV, Statistics, and the IMF, International Financial Statistics. Market
capitalization for the U.S. is the sum of year-end market capitalizations of AMEX, NYSE,
NASDAQ and Chicago. U.S. price-earnings-ratio and dividend yield are for NYSE only.49
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1 No data are available for Japan or Sweden. Also, the UK data include the supplementary pensions.
2 Poverty rates vary from national measures as the LIS uses 50% of the median adjusted disposable personal income
as the poverty threshold.
3 See Turner et al. (1998) for a formalization of the connection between demographic changes and growth. Their
predictions, however, are sensitive to assumptions about unemployment rates and labor force participation.
4 If income is not capped, inequality has an ambiguous effect. Because of the redistributive functions of public
pension benefits, a growing share of high income earners may in fact help public pension finances. The exact effect
depends on each system’s benefits formulas.
5 According to the OECD (1997), income inequality grew in France between 1986 and 1997; the Luxembourg
Income Study (1999b) indicates that income inequality grew in France in the early 1980’s, remained stable in the
late 1980’s, and fell in the 1990’s; and Atkinson (1998) finds that income inequality has continuously declined in
France from 1977 to 1990. According to the Luxembourg Income Study (1999b), inequality rose in Germany from
1981 to 1995; the OECD (1997) indicates continuously income inequality in Germany between 1986 and 1991;
Atkinson (1998) found rising income inequality in Germany from 1977 to 1995; and the DIW (2000) reports
increasing income inequality throughout the 1990s. The OECD (1997) found continuously growing income
inequality in Italy between 1986 and 1991; Atkinson (1998) found that income inequality has grown in Italy from
1991 to 1993; and the LIS (1999) showed that income inequality has risen in Italy from 1991 to 1995. Also, income
inequality appears to have grown in Japan in recent decades as Atkinson (1998) found growing income inequality
between 1977 and 1991. The LIS (1999) showed that income inequality grew in Sweden from 1981 to 1992, and
declined slightly by 1995. The OECD (1997) found also continuously growing income inequality in the UK between
1986 and 1991; the LIS (1999) showed rising income inequality in the UK between 1974 and 1995; and Atkinson
(1998) found that income inequality grew in the UK from 1977 to 1995. Finally, income inequality has grown in the
U.S. between 1986 and 1991 (OECD, 1997), and between 1979 and 1997 (LIS, 1999).
6 See the appendix for a detailed description of the methodology and the assumptions used in the simulations.
7 Because prefunded or partially funded systems impose a larger tax burden on capital than PAYG, our cost
estimates are likely overstating the future burden.
8 It is common to assume that real wage growth is equal to productivity growth in the long run.
9 It is assumed that GDP growth is one percentage point higher than productivity growth.
10A lower normal retirement age is different from early retirement. Under early retirement rules, benefits are
reduced, generally in an actuarially fair way, but with a lower normal retirement age full benefits are paid earlier.
11 Sometimes the complementary mandatory pensions are considered employment related pensions (OECD, 1998a;
Davis, 1994). From a risk perspective, these schemes resemble more public pensions than private pension systems.
12 Also, compulsory membership in a company scheme as a condition of employment was abolished in 1998. Thus
personal pensions to which employers are not required to contribute have increased in numbers (Davis, 1994).
13 Productivity and profits may rise faster than expected, resulting in higher rates of return. However, at this point
forecasts for the future of public pensions would have to be revised, too. Significantly higher productivity growth
rates would result in sharply declining burdens of caring for the elderly as the simulations in section II have shown.
14 Administrative costs amount to 0.7% of benefit payments in Sweden (information provided by the National Social
Insurance Board), to 0.9% in the U.S. (SSA, 2000a), to 1.8% in Japan (Mitchell, 1996), to 1.9% in Italy (ILO, 2000),
to 2.1% in Germany (ILO, 2000), to 3.1% in the UK (Mitchell, 1996), and to 4.2% in France (ILO, 2000).
15 While not all privatization proposals would require the purchase of annuities, it is necessary to include them in a
fair comparison between the costs of private and public pensions.2008
B01-08 Euro-Diplomatie durch gemeinsame „Wirtschaftsregierung“ Martin Seidel
2007
B03-07 Löhne und Steuern im Systemwettbewerb der Mitgliedstaaten
der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B02-07 Konsolidierung und Reform der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B01-07 The Ratiﬁcation of European Treaties - Legal and Constitutio-
nal Basis of a European Referendum.
Martin Seidel
2006
B03-06 Financial Frictions, Capital Reallocation, and Aggregate Fluc-
tuations
Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B02-06 Financial Openness and Macroeconomic Volatility Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
B01-06 A Welfare Analysis of Capital Account Liberalization Jürgen von Hagen, Haiping Zhang
2005
B11-05 Das Kompetenz- und Entscheidungssystem des Vertrages von
Rom im Wandel seiner Funktion und Verfassung
Martin Seidel
B10-05 Die Schutzklauseln der Beitrittsverträge Martin Seidel
B09-05 Measuring Tax Burdens in Europe Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B08-05 Remittances as Investment in the Absence of Altruism Gabriel González-König
B07-05 Economic Integration in a Multicone World? Christian Volpe Martincus, Jenni-
fer Pédussel Wu
B06-05 Banking Sector (Under?)Development in Central and Eastern
Europe
Jürgen von Hagen, Valeriya Din-
ger
B05-05 Regulatory Standards Can Lead to Predation Stefan Lutz
B04-05 Währungspolitik als Sozialpolitik Martin Seidel
B03-05 Public Education in an Integrated Europe: Studying to Migrate
and Teaching to Stay?
Panu Poutvaara
B02-05 Voice of the Diaspora: An Analysis of Migrant Voting Behavior Jan Fidrmuc, Orla Doyle
B01-05 Macroeconomic Adjustment in the New EU Member States Jürgen von Hagen, Iulia Traistaru
2004
B33-04 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability On Foreign
Direct Investment Inﬂows: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B32-04 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Coun-
tries: A Mulitnominal Panal Analysis
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B31-04 Fear of Floating and Fear of Pegging: An Empirical Anaysis of
De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes in Developing Countries
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B30-04 Der Vollzug von Gemeinschaftsrecht über die Mitgliedstaaten
und seine Rolle für die EU und den Beitrittsprozess
Martin Seidel
B29-04 Deutschlands Wirtschaft, seine Schulden und die Unzulänglich-
keiten der einheitlichen Geldpolitik im Eurosystem
Dieter Spethmann, Otto Steiger
B28-04 Fiscal Crises in U.S. Cities: Structural and Non-structural Cau-
ses
Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B27-04 Firm Performance and Privatization in Ukraine Galyna Grygorenko, Stefan Lutz
B26-04 Analyzing Trade Opening in Ukraine: Eﬀects of a Customs Uni-
on with the EU
Oksana Harbuzyuk, Stefan Lutz
B25-04 Exchange Rate Risk and Convergence to the Euro Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-04 The Endogeneity of Money and the Eurosystem Otto Steiger
B23-04 Which Lender of Last Resort for the Eurosystem? Otto Steiger
B22-04 Non-Discretonary Monetary Policy: The Answer for Transition
Economies?
Elham-Maﬁ Kreft, Steven F. Kreft
B21-04 The Eﬀectiveness of Subsidies Revisited: Accounting for Wage
and Employment Eﬀects in Business R+D
Volker Reinthaler, Guntram B.
Wolﬀ
B20-04 Money Market Pressure and the Determinants of Banking Cri-
ses
Jürgen von Hagen, Tai-kuang Ho
B19-04 Die Stellung der Europäischen Zentralbank nach dem Verfas-
sungsvertrag
Martin SeidelB18-04 Transmission Channels of Business Cycles Synchronization in
an Enlarged EMU
Iulia Traistaru
B17-04 Foreign Exchange Regime, the Real Exchange Rate and Current
Account Sustainability: The Case of Turkey
Sübidey Togan, Hasan Ersel
B16-04 Does It Matter Where Immigrants Work? Traded Goods, Non-
traded Goods, and Sector Speciﬁc Employment
Harry P. Bowen, Jennifer Pédussel
Wu
B15-04 Do Economic Integration and Fiscal Competition Help to Ex-
plain Local Patterns?
Christian Volpe Martincus
B14-04 Euro Adoption and Maastricht Criteria: Rules or Discretion? Jiri Jonas
B13-04 The Role of Electoral and Party Systems in the Development of
Fiscal Institutions in the Central and Eastern European Coun-
tries
Sami Yläoutinen
B12-04 Measuring and Explaining Levels of Regional Economic Inte-
gration
Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B11-04 Economic Integration and Location of Manufacturing Activi-
ties: Evidence from MERCOSUR
Pablo Sanguinetti, Iulia Traistaru,
Christian Volpe Martincus
B10-04 Economic Integration and Industry Location in Transition
Countries
Laura Resmini
B09-04 Testing Creditor Moral Hazard in Souvereign Bond Markets: A
Uniﬁed Theoretical Approach and Empirical Evidence
Ayse Y. Evrensel, Ali M. Kutan
B08-04 European Integration, Productivity Growth and Real Conver-
gence
Taner M. Yigit, Ali M. Kutan
B07-04 The Contribution of Income, Social Capital, and Institutions to
Human Well-being in Africa
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B06-04 Rural Urban Inequality in Africa: A Panel Study of the Eﬀects
of Trade Liberalization and Financial Deepening
Mina Baliamoune-Lutz, Stefan H.
Lutz
B05-04 Money Rules for the Eurozone Candidate Countries Lucjan T. Orlowski
B04-04 Who is in Favor of Enlargement? Determinants of Support for
EU Membership in the Candidate Countries’ Referenda
Orla Doyle, Jan Fidrmuc
B03-04 Over- and Underbidding in Central Bank Open Market Opera-
tions Conducted as Fixed Rate Tender
Ulrich Bindseil
B02-04 Total Factor Productivity and Economic Freedom Implications
for EU Enlargement
Ronald L. Moomaw, Euy Seok
Yang
B01-04 Die neuen Schutzklauseln der Artikel 38 und 39 des Bei-
trittsvertrages: Schutz der alten Mitgliedstaaten vor Störungen
durch die neuen Mitgliedstaaten
Martin Seidel
2003
B29-03 Macroeconomic Implications of Low Inﬂation in the Euro Area Jürgen von Hagen, Boris Hofmann
B28-03 The Eﬀects of Transition and Political Instability on Foreign
Direct Investment: Central Europe and the Balkans
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Ta-
ner M. Yigit
B27-03 The Performance of the Euribor Futures Market: Eﬃciency and
the Impact of ECB Policy Announcements (Electronic Version
of International Finance)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen
B26-03 Souvereign Risk Premia in the European Government Bond
Market (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterladen)
Kerstin Bernoth, Juergen von Ha-
gen, Ludger Schulknecht
B25-03 How Flexible are Wages in EU Accession Countries? Anna Iara, Iulia Traistaru
B24-03 Monetary Policy Reaction Functions: ECB versus Bundesbank Bernd Hayo, Boris Hofmann
B23-03 Economic Integration and Manufacturing Concentration Pat-
terns: Evidence from Mercosur
Iulia Traistaru, Christian Volpe
Martincus
B22-03 Reformzwänge innerhalb der EU angesichts der Osterweiterung Martin Seidel
B21-03 Reputation Flows: Contractual Disputes and the Channels for
Inter-Firm Communication
William Pyle
B20-03 Urban Primacy, Gigantism, and International Trade: Evidence
from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. Alwosabi
B19-03 An Empirical Analysis of Competing Explanations of Urban Pri-
macy Evidence from Asia and the Americas
Ronald L. Moomaw, Mohammed
A. AlwosabiB18-03 The Eﬀects of Regional and Industry-Wide FDI Spillovers on
Export of Ukrainian Firms
Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra, Sang-Min Park
B17-03 Determinants of Inter-Regional Migration in the Baltic States Mihails Hazans
B16-03 South-East Europe: Economic Performance, Perspectives, and
Policy Challenges
Iulia Traistaru, Jürgen von Hagen
B15-03 Employed and Unemployed Search: The Marginal Willingness
to Pay for Attributes in Lithuania, the US and the Netherlands
Jos van Ommeren, Mihails Hazans
B14-03 FCIs and Economic Activity: Some International Evidence Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B13-03 The IS Curve and the Transmission of Monetary Policy: Is there
a Puzzle?
Charles Goodhart, Boris Hofmann
B12-03 What Makes Regions in Eastern Europe Catching Up? The
Role of Foreign Investment, Human Resources, and Geography
Gabriele Tondl, Goran Vuksic
B11-03 Die Weisungs- und Herrschaftsmacht der Europäischen Zen-
tralbank im europäischen System der Zentralbanken - eine
rechtliche Analyse
Martin Seidel
B10-03 Foreign Direct Investment and Perceptions of Vulnerability to
Foreign Exchange Crises: Evidence from Transition Economies
Josef C. Brada, Vladimír Tomsík
B09-03 The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem: An Analy-
sis of the Missing Central Monetary Institution in European
Monetary Union
Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B08-03 The Determination of Capital Controls: Which Role Do Ex-
change Rate Regimes Play?
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B07-03 Nach Nizza und Stockholm: Stand des Binnenmarktes und
Prioritäten für die Zukunft
Martin Seidel
B06-03 Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact
Jürgen von Hagen
B05-03 Reconsidering the Evidence: Are Eurozone Business Cycles
Converging?
Michael Massmann, James Mit-
chell
B04-03 Do Ukrainian Firms Beneﬁt from FDI? Stefan H. Lutz, Oleksandr Talave-
ra
B03-03 Europäische Steuerkoordination und die Schweiz Stefan H. Lutz
B02-03 Commuting in the Baltic States: Patterns, Determinants, and
Gains
Mihails Hazans
B01-03 Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im rechtlichen und poli-
tischen Gefüge der Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
2002
B30-02 An Adverse Selection Model of Optimal Unemployment Ass-
urance
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul,
Tim Mennel
B29B-02 Trade Agreements as Self-protection Jennifer Pédussel Wu
B29A-02 Growth and Business Cycles with Imperfect Credit Markets Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B28-02 Inequality, Politics and Economic Growth Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B27-02 Poverty Traps and Growth in a Model of Endogenous Time
Preference
Debajyoti Chakrabarty
B26-02 Monetary Convergence and Risk Premiums in the EU Candi-
date Countries
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B25-02 Trade Policy: Institutional Vs. Economic Factors Stefan Lutz
B24-02 The Eﬀects of Quotas on Vertical Intra-industry Trade Stefan Lutz
B23-02 Legal Aspects of European Economic and Monetary Union Martin Seidel
B22-02 Der Staat als Lender of Last Resort - oder: Die Achillesverse
des Eurosystems
Otto Steiger
B21-02 Nominal and Real Stochastic Convergence Within the Tran-
sition Economies and to the European Union: Evidence from
Panel Data
Ali M. Kutan, Taner M. Yigit
B20-02 The Impact of News, Oil Prices, and International Spillovers
on Russian Fincancial Markets
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. KutanB19-02 East Germany: Transition with Uniﬁcation, Experiments and
Experiences
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R.
Strauch, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B18-02 Regional Specialization and Employment Dynamics in Transi-
tion Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Guntram B. Wolﬀ
B17-02 Specialization and Growth Patterns in Border Regions of Ac-
cession Countries
Laura Resmini
B16-02 Regional Specialization and Concentration of Industrial Activity
in Accession Countries
Iulia Traistaru, Peter Nijkamp, Si-
monetta Longhi
B15-02 Does Broad Money Matter for Interest Rate Policy? Matthias Brückner, Andreas Scha-
ber
B14-02 The Long and Short of It: Global Liberalization, Poverty and
Inequality
Christian E. Weller, Adam Hersch
B13-02 De Facto and Oﬃcial Exchange Rate Regimes in Transition
Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B12-02 Argentina: The Anatomy of A Crisis Jiri Jonas
B11-02 The Eurosystem and the Art of Central Banking Gunnar Heinsohn, Otto Steiger
B10-02 National Origins of European Law: Towards an Autonomous
System of European Law?
Martin Seidel
B09-02 Monetary Policy in the Euro Area - Lessons from the First Years Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B08-02 Has the Link Between the Spot and Forward Exchange Rates
Broken Down? Evidence From Rolling Cointegration Tests
Ali M. Kutan, Su Zhou
B07-02 Perspektiven der Erweiterung der Europäischen Union Martin Seidel
B06-02 Is There Asymmetry in Forward Exchange Rate Bias? Multi-
Country Evidence
Su Zhou, Ali M. Kutan
B05-02 Real and Monetary Convergence Within the European Union
and Between the European Union and Candidate Countries: A
Rolling Cointegration Approach
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan, Su
Zhou
B04-02 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Eﬀects in EMU Volker Clausen, Bernd Hayo
B03-02 The Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes: An Empirical Analysis
for Transition Economies
Jürgen von Hagen, Jizhong Zhou
B02-02 The Euro System and the Federal Reserve System Compared:
Facts and Challenges
Karlheinz Ruckriegel, Franz Seitz
B01-02 Does Inﬂation Targeting Matter? Manfred J. M. Neumann, Jürgen
von Hagen
2001
B29-01 Is Kazakhstan Vulnerable to the Dutch Disease? Karlygash Kuralbayeva, Ali M. Ku-
tan, Michael L. Wyzan
B28-01 Political Economy of the Nice Treaty: Rebalancing the EU
Council. The Future of European Agricultural Policies
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B27-01 Investor Panic, IMF Actions, and Emerging Stock Market Re-
turns and Volatility: A Panel Investigation
Bernd Hayo, Ali M. Kutan
B26-01 Regional Eﬀects of Terrorism on Tourism: Evidence from Three
Mediterranean Countries
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B25-01 Monetary Convergence of the EU Candidates to the Euro: A
Theoretical Framework and Policy Implications
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B24-01 Disintegration and Trade Jarko and Jan Fidrmuc
B23-01 Migration and Adjustment to Shocks in Transition Economies Jan Fidrmuc
B22-01 Strategic Delegation and International Capital Taxation Matthias Brückner
B21-01 Balkan and Mediterranean Candidates for European Union
Membership: The Convergence of Their Monetary Policy With
That of the Europaen Central Bank
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-01 An Empirical Inquiry of the Eﬃciency of Intergovernmental
Transfers for Water Projects Based on the WRDA Data
Anna Rubinchik-Pessach
B19-01 Detrending and the Money-Output Link: International Evi-
dence
R.W. Hafer, Ali M. KutanB18-01 Monetary Policy in Unknown Territory. The European Central
Bank in the Early Years
Jürgen von Hagen, Matthias
Brückner
B17-01 Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline
in Latin American and Carribean Countries
Mark Hallerberg, Patrick Marier
B16-01 Sources of Inﬂation and Output Fluctuations in Poland and
Hungary: Implications for Full Membership in the European
Union
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B15-01 Programs Without Alternative: Public Pensions in the OECD Christian E. Weller
B14-01 Formal Fiscal Restraints and Budget Processes As Solutions to
a Deﬁcit and Spending Bias in Public Finances - U.S. Experi-
ence and Possible Lessons for EMU
Rolf R. Strauch, Jürgen von Hagen
B13-01 German Public Finances: Recent Experiences and Future Chal-
lenges
Jürgen von Hagen, Rolf R. Strauch
B12-01 The Impact of Eastern Enlargement On EU-Labour Markets.
Pensions Reform Between Economic and Political Problems
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B11-01 Inﬂationary Performance in a Monetary Union With Large Wa-
ge Setters
Lilia Cavallar
B10-01 Integration of the Baltic States into the EU and Institutions
of Fiscal Convergence: A Critical Evaluation of Key Issues and
Empirical Evidence
Ali M. Kutan, Niina Pautola-Mol
B09-01 Democracy in Transition Economies: Grease or Sand in the
Wheels of Growth?
Jan Fidrmuc
B08-01 The Functioning of Economic Policy Coordination Jürgen von Hagen, Susanne
Mundschenk
B07-01 The Convergence of Monetary Policy Between Candidate
Countries and the European Union
Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B06-01 Opposites Attract: The Case of Greek and Turkish Financial
Markets
Konstantinos Drakos, Ali M. Ku-
tan
B05-01 Trade Rules and Global Governance: A Long Term Agenda.
The Future of Banking.
Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B04-01 The Determination of Unemployment Beneﬁts Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch
B03-01 Preferences Over Inﬂation and Unemployment: Evidence from
Surveys of Happiness
Rafael di Tella, Robert J. Mac-
Culloch, Andrew J. Oswald
B02-01 The Konstanz Seminar on Monetary Theory and Policy at Thir-
ty
Michele Fratianni, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
B01-01 Divided Boards: Partisanship Through Delegated Monetary Po-
licy
Etienne Farvaque, Gael Lagadec
2000
B20-00 Breakin-up a Nation, From the Inside Etienne Farvaque
B19-00 Income Dynamics and Stability in the Transition Process, ge-
neral Reﬂections applied to the Czech Republic
Jens Hölscher
B18-00 Budget Processes: Theory and Experimental Evidence Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Roy Gardner,
Jürgen von Hagen, Claudia Keser
B17-00 Rückführung der Landwirtschaftspolitik in die Verantwortung
der Mitgliedsstaaten? - Rechts- und Verfassungsfragen des Ge-
meinschaftsrechts
Martin Seidel
B16-00 The European Central Bank: Independence and Accountability Christa Randzio-Plath, Tomasso
Padoa-Schioppa
B15-00 Regional Risk Sharing and Redistribution in the German Fede-
ration
Jürgen von Hagen, Ralf Hepp
B14-00 Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations in Transition Eco-
nomies: The Case of Poland and Hungary
Selahattin Dibooglu, Ali M. Kutan
B13-00 Back to the Future: The Growth Prospects of Transition Eco-
nomies Reconsidered
Nauro F. CamposB12-00 Rechtsetzung und Rechtsangleichung als Folge der Einheitli-
chen Europäischen Währung
Martin Seidel
B11-00 A Dynamic Approach to Inﬂation Targeting in Transition Eco-
nomies
Lucjan T. Orlowski
B10-00 The Importance of Domestic Political Institutions: Why and
How Belgium Qualiﬁed for EMU
Marc Hallerberg
B09-00 Rational Institutions Yield Hysteresis Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B08-00 The Eﬀectiveness of Self-Protection Policies for Safeguarding
Emerging Market Economies from Crises
Kenneth Kletzer
B07-00 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in The EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B06-00 The Demand for Money in Austria Bernd Hayo
B05-00 Liberalization, Democracy and Economic Performance during
Transition
Jan Fidrmuc
B04-00 A New Political Culture in The EU - Democratic Accountability
of the ECB
Christa Randzio-Plath
B03-00 Integration, Disintegration and Trade in Europe: Evolution of
Trade Relations during the 1990’s
Jarko Fidrmuc, Jan Fidrmuc
B02-00 Inﬂation Bias and Productivity Shocks in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Czech Republic
Josef C. Barda, Arthur E. King, Ali
M. Kutan
B01-00 Monetary Union and Fiscal Federalism Kenneth Kletzer, Jürgen von Ha-
gen
1999
B26-99 Skills, Labour Costs, and Vertically Diﬀerentiated Industries: A
General Equilibrium Analysis
Stefan Lutz, Alessandro Turrini
B25-99 Micro and Macro Determinants of Public Support for Market
Reforms in Eastern Europe
Bernd Hayo
B24-99 What Makes a Revolution? Robert MacCulloch
B23-99 Informal Family Insurance and the Design of the Welfare State Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B22-99 Partisan Social Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch
B21-99 The End of Moderate Inﬂation in Three Transition Economies? Josef C. Brada, Ali M. Kutan
B20-99 Subnational Government Bailouts in Germany Helmut Seitz
B19-99 The Evolution of Monetary Policy in Transition Economies Ali M. Kutan, Josef C. Brada
B18-99 Why are Eastern Europe’s Banks not failing when everybody
else’s are?
Christian E. Weller, Bernard Mor-
zuch
B17-99 Stability of Monetary Unions: Lessons from the Break-Up of
Czechoslovakia
Jan Fidrmuc, Julius Horvath and
Jarko Fidrmuc
B16-99 Multinational Banks and Development Finance Christian E.Weller and Mark J.
Scher
B15-99 Financial Crises after Financial Liberalization: Exceptional Cir-
cumstances or Structural Weakness?
Christian E. Weller
B14-99 Industry Eﬀects of Monetary Policy in Germany Bernd Hayo and Birgit Uhlenbrock
B13-99 Fiancial Fragility or What Went Right and What Could Go
Wrong in Central European Banking?
Christian E. Weller and Jürgen von
Hagen
B12 -99 Size Distortions of Tests of the Null Hypothesis of Stationarity:
Evidence and Implications for Applied Work
Mehmet Caner and Lutz Kilian
B11-99 Financial Supervision and Policy Coordination in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B10-99 Financial Liberalization, Multinational Banks and Credit Sup-
ply: The Case of Poland
Christian Weller
B09-99 Monetary Policy, Parameter Uncertainty and Optimal Learning Volker Wieland
B08-99 The Connection between more Multinational Banks and less
Real Credit in Transition Economies
Christian WellerB07-99 Comovement and Catch-up in Productivity across Sectors: Evi-
dence from the OECD
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B06-99 Productivity Convergence and Economic Growth: A Frontier
Production Function Approach
Christopher M. Cornwell and Jens-
Uwe Wächter
B05-99 Tumbling Giant: Germany‘s Experience with the Maastricht
Fiscal Criteria
Jürgen von Hagen and Rolf
Strauch
B04-99 The Finance-Investment Link in a Transition Economy: Evi-
dence for Poland from Panel Data
Christian Weller
B03-99 The Macroeconomics of Happiness Rafael Di Tella, Robert Mac-
Culloch and Andrew J. Oswald
B02-99 The Consequences of Labour Market Flexibility: Panel Evidence
Based on Survey Data
Rafael Di Tella and Robert Mac-
Culloch
B01-99 The Excess Volatility of Foreign Exchange Rates: Statistical
Puzzle or Theoretical Artifact?
Robert B.H. Hauswald
1998
B16-98 Labour Market + Tax Policy in the EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B15-98 Can Taxing Foreign Competition Harm the Domestic Industry? Stefan Lutz
B14-98 Free Trade and Arms Races: Some Thoughts Regarding EU-
Russian Trade
Rafael Reuveny and John Maxwell
B13-98 Fiscal Policy and Intranational Risk-Sharing Jürgen von Hagen
B12-98 Price Stability and Monetary Policy Eﬀectiveness when Nomi-
nal Interest Rates are Bounded at Zero
Athanasios Orphanides and Volker
Wieland
B11A-98 Die Bewertung der "dauerhaft tragbaren öﬀentlichen Finanz-
lage"der EU Mitgliedstaaten beim Übergang zur dritten Stufe
der EWWU
Rolf Strauch
B11-98 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Transition Economies: Case Stu-
dy of the Czech Republic: 1990-1997
Julius Horvath and Jiri Jonas
B10-98 Der Wettbewerb der Rechts- und politischen Systeme in der
Europäischen Union
Martin Seidel
B09-98 U.S. Monetary Policy and Monetary Policy and the ESCB Robert L. Hetzel
B08-98 Money-Output Granger Causality Revisited: An Empirical Ana-
lysis of EU Countries (überarbeitete Version zum Herunterla-
den)
Bernd Hayo
B07-98 Designing Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Europe: So-
me Lessons from the U.S. EPA’s 33/50 Program
John W. Maxwell
B06-98 Monetary Union, Asymmetric Productivity Shocks and Fiscal
Insurance: an Analytical Discussion of Welfare Issues
Kenneth Kletzer
B05-98 Estimating a European Demand for Money (überarbeitete Ver-
sion zum Herunterladen)
Bernd Hayo
B04-98 The EMU’s Exchange Rate Policy Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B03-98 Central Bank Policy in a More Perfect Financial System Jürgen von Hagen / Ingo Fender
B02-98 Trade with Low-Wage Countries and Wage Inequality Jaleel Ahmad
B01-98 Budgeting Institutions for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline Jürgen von Hagen
1997
B04-97 Macroeconomic Stabilization with a Common Currency: Does
European Monetary Uniﬁcation Create a Need for Fiscal Ins-
urance or Federalism?
Kenneth Kletzer
B-03-97 Liberalising European Markets for Energy and Telecommunica-
tions: Some Lessons from the US Electric Utility Industry
Tom Lyon / John Mayo
B02-97 Employment and EMU Deutsch-Französisches Wirt-
schaftspolitisches Forum
B01-97 A Stability Pact for Europe (a Forum organized by ZEI)ISSN 1436 - 6053
Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung
Center for European Integration Studies
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
Walter-Flex-Strasse 3 Tel.: +49-228-73-1732
D-53113 Bonn Fax: +49-228-73-1809
Germany www.zei.de